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EXPROPRIATORY INTENT: DEFINING THE
PROPER BOUNDARIES OF SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS AND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
RONALD

J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR.*

This Article examines and critiques the contemporary Supreme
Court's expansive construction of the Takings Clause. Although
the Supreme Court generally has decried the use of substantive due
process to invalidate economic and social legislation,many of the
recent regulatory takings cases deploy the Takings Clause to
second-guess the legitimacy or fundamental fairness of such
enactments. The Article argues that when a plaintiff alleges that a
federal or state law is fundamentally unjust or arbitrary, the
federal courts should analyze the merits of the claim under the
rubricof substantive due process, ratherthan the Takings Clause.
As Justice Holmes observed in Pennsylvania Coal Company v.
Mahon, some regulations, although styled as police power
enactments, constitute de facto expropriationsof private property.
Recent regulatory takings cases, however, utilize a hodgepodge of
factors to determine the essential nature of the government's
action. In lieu of continued reliance on these disparate tests,
federal courts should ask and answer a single inquiry: in the
totality of the circumstances, has the government acted with
expropriatory, rather than regulatory, intent (for example, is the
regulation effectively a proxy for the exercise of the eminent
domain power)? This approach would bring needed doctrinal
clarity to a muddled area of constitutional law. Moreover, it
would preclude takings claims associated with most basic health,
safety, and environmental laws and regulations (all of which
would be, and should be, subject to substantive due process
review).
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In recent years, the Supreme Court has attempted-without
much success-to disentangle the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment from the substantive aspect of the Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.' The need for such an
1. See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522-24 (1998) (plurality opinion)
(applying the Takings Clause to challenge a federal statute imposing retroactive funding
liability for retired coal miners' medical benefits and finding a violation); id- at 539
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (applying substantive due
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undertaking results from the Supreme Court's increasing willingness
to permit disgruntled property owners to invoke the Takings Clause
as a catchall guarantor of property interests2 Despite this doctrinal
confusion, the Supreme Court has continued to deploy the Takings
Clause (a provision that, on its face, does not limit the scope of
government power, but rather conditions government action on the

payment of "just compensation")3 to limit the ability of government
to adopt certain economic and social regulations.4

Over the past two decades, the Justices have defined the scope of
the Takings Clause in ever-broader terms, effectively transforming a

protection against uncompensated eminent domain actions into a
general-purpose guarantor of any and all private property rights.5
This Article argues that the Due Process Clauses, rather than the
Takings Clause, should serve as the source of a generalized
constitutional protection of property rights against arbitrary or
fundamentally unfair government actions.
process analysis to the same issue to support an identical conclusion); id. at 553 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (applying substantive due process analysis but concluding that the statute is not
fundamentally unfair or irrational); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 n.5 (1994)
(noting a dispute between majority and dissenting Justices on whether the Takings Clause
or the doctrine of substantive due process should govern the case); id. at 405-07 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority has interpreted the Takings Clause in a fashion
that largely replicates the effects of Lochner v. New York).
2. But cf First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 339 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In my opinion, however, it is the Due
Process Clause rather than that doctrine [the regulatory takings doctrine] that protects the
property owner from improperly motivated, unfairly conducted, or unnecessarily
protracted governmental decisionmaking.").
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. Several prominent legal scholars, including Professor Richard Epstein and Judge
Richard Posner, have advocated such an interpretation of the Takings Clause for many
years. See, e.g., Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 463-66 (7th Cir.
1988) (Posner, J.); Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. United States, 678 F.2d 665, 668-70 (7th
Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.); JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT 39, 133-34 (1992); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 5, 16, 25-30 (1985) [hereinafter, EPSTEIN, TAKINGS];
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 56-61 (4th ed. 1992); Richard
A. Epstein, History Lean: The Reconciliation of Private Property and Representative
Government, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 591, 595-98 (1995); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original
Understanding of the Takings Clause Is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1630, 1639-40 (1988). But cf Gerald Torres, Taking and Giving: Police Power, Public
Value, and Private Right, 26 ENVTL. L. 1, 5-10 (1996) (criticizing the use of the Takings
Clause as a limitation on the exercise of traditional police powers). These efforts have not
been in vain in light of recent events. See infra notes 73-98 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 702-03 (1999); E.
Enters., 524 U.S. at 522-24 (plurality opinion); Dolan, 512 U.S. at 383-86; Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014-16 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 831-36 (1987); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,260-63 (1980).
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At least five descriptions of compensable takings now exist.
Almost any physical occupation of real property by the government
constitutes a taking,6 even if it occurs for only a limited period.7
Regulations that deny the owner of land all economically beneficial
use of the land also constitute a taking.' Conditional approval of
improvements to land, where the conditions are unrelated to the
problems associated with the development, can constitute a taking. 9
A taking also can occur when the conditions for approval relate to the
development problems, but are disproportionate to the scope or
degree of the problems that the proposed development will cause.10
Expropriation of cash constitutes a taking, even if the owner might
not have a legal right to the specific monies taken."l Finally, a
regulation of land might constitute a taking depending on the
economic impact of the regulation on the landowner, the regulation's
consistency with reasonable, investment-backed1 2expectations, and the
general "character" of the government's action.
Notwithstanding this plethora of approaches, the Supreme Court
consistently has decried reliance on any one test or combination of
tests when deciding regulatory takings cases. "In 70-odd years of
succeeding 'regulatory takings' jurisprudence, we have generally
eschewed any "set formula" for determining how far is too far,
preferring to 'engag[e] in ...essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.' "13
Unsurprisingly, this lack of doctrinal clarity has greatly facilitated
ever-broader judicial applications of the Takings Clause.
6. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426-35
(1982).
7. See FirstEnglish EvangelicalLutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 312-20.
8. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-16.
9. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-39.
10. See Dolan,512 U.S. at 391.
11. See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 163-70 (1998); Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160-64 (1980); see also Wash. Legal Found. v.
Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 270 F.3d 180, 185-95 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that
expropriation of interest on lawyer trust accounts constitutes a per se taking and declining
to apply Penn Centralanalysis).
12. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-25 (1978); see
also PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-83 (1980) (holding that the
reviewing court in a takings case must inquire "into such factors as the character of the
governmental action, its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable
investment-backed expectations").
13. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (quoting
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)) (alteration in original)); see also id.at
1071 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("We have frequently and consistently recognized that the
definition of a taking cannot be reduced to a 'set formula' and that determining whether a
regulation is a taking is 'essentially [an] ad hoc factual inquir[y].' ") (quoting Penn Cent.
Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (quoting Goldblatt,369 U.S. at 594)) (alterations in original)).
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Recent cases have pushed the scope of the Takings Clause

further and further from the paradigmatic case of government
expropriating land for public use. 4 This shift has not gone unnoticed;
dissenting justices have vigorously objected to the conservative
majority's effort to transform the Takings Clause into a new source of
Lochner-esque restrictions on federal and state health, safety, and
welfare regulations. 5
In theory, the federal courts could attempt to metamorphose the
Takings Clause into an all-purpose protector of property interests.
Even so, a reasonable observer might question the usefulness of
torturing the text of the Takings Clause to fit virtually all scenarios
imposing a burden on a property interest. Reviving meaningful
substantive due process review of legislation affecting economic or
property interests might represent a superior jurisprudence. Indeed,
the Supreme Court's willingness to police the limits of punitive
damages awarded under state tort law strongly suggests that, at least
in some circumstances, the ghost of economic due process continues
to haunt the pages of the United States Reports. 6
14. See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 538 (1998) (plurality opinion)
(invalidating retroactive funding obligation for retired miners' benefits as a regulatory
taking). For a discussion of the "original understanding" of the Takings Clause, see
generally William M. Treanor, Note, The Origins and Significance of the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE LJ. 694 (1985).
15. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 405-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority
reinstated Lochner review under the rubric of regulatory takings analysis); Lucas, 505 U.S.
at 1068-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the majority's approach to regulatory
takings harkens back to the Lochner doctrine); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 339-41 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing

that the majority's approach to regulatory takings doctrine will impede, if not prevent,
promulgation of important health and safety regulations for fear of engendering financial
liabilities under the regulatory takings doctrine); see also Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384 n.5
(noting the existence of a dispute among Justices regarding the proper source of
constitutional protection of property rights). Under the Lochner doctrine, the federal
courts routinely scrutinized state and federal laws regulating the economy under a
standard of unreasonableness "but in practice found many laws designed to protect the
physical and economic well-being of workers to be 'unreasonable.'" See Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555, 561-67 (1997)
(describing and critiquing the Lochner doctrine). The Supreme Court formally
abandoned Lochner in 1937. See id. at 566-67; see also W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379, 388-96 (1937) (sustaining, against a Lochner challenge, minimum wage
legislation); cf Morehead v. New York ex rel Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 610-18 (1936)
(invalidating minimum wage legislation virtually identical to the statute at issue in West
Coast Hotel on Lochner grounds).
16. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75, 585-86 (1996); Honda

Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415,420-21 (1994); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp.,
509 U.S. 443, 453-58 (1993); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1991); cf
LON FULLER, THE MORALrrY OF LAW 170-76 (rev. ed. 1969) (arguing that adjudication

is an inept means for allocating economic resources).
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Under the federal Constitution, all persons (including fictive
persons) should enjoy stable property rights. This interest, however,
sounds not in the language of eminent domain, but rather in the more
measured cadence of substantive due process. The enjoyment of
stable property rights falls under substantive due process because
when the government acts as a regulator, it does not "take" property,
even though health, safety, and welfare regulations often incidentally
burden the use or enjoyment of property, or obligate citizens to pay
money to the government. For reasons that will be developed more
fully below, a valid Takings Clause claim should not lie every time a
government action adversely affects a property right, but rather the
federal courts should recognize takings claims only when government
acts with expropriatory intent. 7
This Article proposes that the Supreme Court cabin the scope of
its regulatory takings doctrine by requiring a would-be plaintiff to
establish that the regulation does not really advance a legitimate
health, safety, or welfare objective. The consequences of failing to
limit meaningfully the scope of the Takings Clause would be quite
undesirable-nothing less than the ability of the federal and state
governments to enact laws and regulations that promote the entire
community's welfare is at stake. The federal courts could best
achieve the necessary doctrinal limitations by imposing an additional
element to regulatory takings claims: a showing of expropriatory
intent on the part of the government entity that established the
ostensibly confiscatory regulation.
Government certainly could use the cadence of "public safety" to
enact land use restrictions (or restrictions on other forms of property)
that merely mask an expropriation of private property for
government use. The mere invocation of public safety must not serve
as a shibboleth that precludes any meaningful judicial inquiry into the
real intent and effect of the regulation at issue. Wrapping a de facto
expropriation in the cellophane wrapper of a police power enactment
should not preclude a property owner from obtaining "just
compensation" from the government.18 At the same time, however,
the federal courts must not deploy the Takings Clause in a fashion

17. See infra text and accompanying notes 125-36.
18. See generally Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-15 (1922) (holding that
"regulatory takings" are cognizable under the Takings Clause and that regulations that
"go too far" trigger the just compensation requirement).
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that risks resurrecting the long-discredited doctrine of Lochner v.
New York.19
Under a theory of "expropriatory intent," a would-be Takings
Clause plaintiff should be required to show, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the government action that adversely affected her
property interest was tantamount to an eminent domain action. If
government uses the pretext of a regulatory enactment to achieve a
de facto expropriation, a takings claim should lie 2 Conversely, when
government acts in a regulatory capacity (that is, with "regulatory
intent"), the fact that the regulations adversely affect property values
should not suffice to support a valid takings claim.2

As will be developed more fully below,2 many benefits would
result from incorporating the question of expropriatory intent into
the Supreme Court's contemporary regulatory takings doctrine.
Perhaps most importantly, it would ensure that Takings Clause
doctrine does not morph into a revived Lochner doctrine. Given that
several members of the conservative majority routinely proclaim their
trust in the good sense and basic fairness of democratically elected
legislatures z3 it is, at best, anomalous for these very same Justices to
ride across the jurisprudential countryside on extended hunt and
destroy missions under the rubric of "regulatory takings."
Other benefits might also accrue: An approach to regulatory
takings premised on expropriatory intent would be more
intellectually honest and give a more choate meaning to Justice
19. 198 U.S. 45, 53-58 (1905); see Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Allure of
Consequential Fit, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1261, 1262-69 (2000) (arguing that contemporary
Takings Clause jurisprudence arguably constitutes a return to the Lochner doctrine).
20. See, e.g., Pa.Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415.

21. But cf E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 528-37 (1998) (plurality opinion)
(recognizing a viable regulatory takings claim on facts that did not establish expropriatory
intent on the part of the government).
22. See infra text and accompanying notes 73-136.
23. Consider, for example, this celebration of democratic self-rule from Justice Scalia:
Consequently, while I would think it entirely compatible with the commitment to
representative democracy set forth in the founding documents to argue, in the
legislative chambers or in electoral campaigns, that the state has no power to
interfere with parents' authority over the rearing of their children, I do not
believe that the power which the Constitution confers upon me as a judge entitles
me to deny legal effect to laws that (in my view) infringe what is (in my view)
that unenumerated right.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91-92 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979-S0 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and White & Thomas, JJ.) ("The permissibility of abortion, and the
limitations upon it, are to be resolved like most important questions in our democracy: by

citizens trying to persuade one another and then voting.").
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Holmes' aphorism that regulations that "go[] too far"24 are takings;
additionally, it would more fully credit the text and historical
understanding of the Takings Clause and have the decided advantage
of relating directly to these textual and historical moorings; and
finally it would relocate generalized inquiries into the basic fairness of
government action where they belong-under the rubric of
substantive due process.
Of course, the federal courts should never permit government to
act in a fundamentally unfair or arbitrary fashion.' If a government26
action adversely affects a cognizable liberty or property interest,
citizens should be able to demand fundamental fairness with respect
to the means used to achieve the governmental objective. Statutes or
common law rules imposing retroactive liability, or imposing
unlimited punitive damages, arguably transgress this expectation of
basic fairness. 27 Such claims deserve careful judicial scrutiny-but
under the substantive aspect of the Due Process Clauses, rather than
the Takings Clause.'
Part I of this Article describes and analyzes the Justices' opinions
in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,2 9 a case that squarely presents the
question of whether the Takings Clause or substantive due process
encompasses a generalized right against governmental imposition of
unreasonable burdens on private property interests. Part II considers
the potentially unlimited reach of the Eastern Enterprises plurality's
gloss on the scope of the Takings Clause. Part III evaluates Justice
Kennedy's alternative reading of the Takings Clause, an approach
that would ask whether the government specifies a particular
24. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415.
25. See generally William Van Alstyne, Cracks in the New Property: Adjudicative Due
Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 445, 487-90 (1977) (arguing that

federal courts should broadly construe the concept of due process of law to protect citizens
from any "procedural grossness" regardless of the precise nature of the liberty or property
interest at issue).
26. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972); Bd. of Regents of State Colls.
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-75 (1972); see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of
ConstitutionalProperty,86 VA. L. REV. 885, 895-954 (2000) (describing and criticizing the
Supreme Court's efforts to define and delimit the "property" interests protected by the
Due Process Clauses).
27. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 58-61 (1999); BMW of N.
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415,
420-21 (1994).
28. See, e.g., Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 146-48 (1938) (holding that retroactive
forms of taxation are subject to challenge under the doctrine of substantive due process
and promising to invalidate such laws if, in operation, they prove to be "so harsh and
oppressive as to transgress the constitutional limitation").
29. 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (plurality opinion).
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property interest when creating a regulatory burden, but rejects it in
favor of an approach based on the fundamental nature of the
government's action (as reflected by the government's probable
intent when acting). Part IV argues that, in the absence of
expropriatory intent, a takings claim should not lie against the
government. Part V examines some potential objections to an intentbased approach to the Takings Clause. Finally, this Article concludes
that requiring expropriatory intent as an essential element of a
regulatory takings claim would bring needed doctrinal clarity to an
otherwise muddled area of constitutional law.
I. EASTERN ENTERPRISES AND THE SCOPE OF THE TAKINGS

A RESULT IN SEARCH OF A RATIONALE
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel 0 highlights the utility of the
expropriatory intent approach to regulatory takings jurisprudence. In
EasternEnterprises,the Supreme Court of the United States faced the
question of whether and how the Constitution limits the ability of
Congress to impose retroactive financial obligations on a limited class
of entities. Eastern Enterprises, facing a multi-million dollar annual
liability under a novel health benefits funding scheme for retired coal
miners, challenged certain provisions of the Coal Industry Retiree
Health Benefit Act of 1992 (the Coal Act). The company argued that
the funding provisions violated both principles of substantive due
process and the Takings Clause.
The Justices divided sharply when deciding the case, with no
single opinion garnering five votes. A four-justice plurality, led by
Justice O'Connor, held that the Coal Act's funding scheme violated
the Takings Clause.3' Justice Kennedy, writing only for himself,
agreed that the statute was unconstitutional, but held that this result
Four Justices
flowed from substantive due process analysis.3
the Takings
either
violated
the
statute
result-that
the
dissented from
relied
Clause or substantive due process-but, like Justice Kennedy,
3
on substantive due process analysis to decide the case?
CLAUSE:

The FactualBackground
The facts of Eastern Enterprises are reasonably straightforward.
In 1992, Congress resolved a longstanding controversy over the

A.

30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. (plurality opinion).
I&at 522-24 (plurality opinion).
It at 539 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 553 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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funding of certain health benefits for retired coal miners by imposing
funding obligations on all entities that employed such workers
(whether at present or at some point in the distant past). 4 Sources of
funding for miners' and retired miners' health care benefits varied
considerably from 1947 to 1992; a series of voluntary industry-union
agreements created a funding scheme that provided defined benefits
for covered employees and retirees. 35 By the 1970s, however, the
funding mechanisms proved inadequate to the task of providing
comprehensive benefits-benefits to which the miners and retired
miners believed they were entitled.
In 1988, Congress, the unions, and the industry began to work on
a comprehensive reform plan to secure adequate funding for the
health care benefits. Elizabeth Dole, then-Secretary of Labor,
convened the Advisory Commission on United Mine Workers of
America Retiree Health Benefits to facilitate these negotiations.36
The Commission recommended a new funding mechanism that would
require both current employers of coal miners and employers of
presently retired coal miners to make substantial annual financial
contributions to a trust fund that would pay for the benefits.37
Congress ultimately enacted legislation requiring any signatory
(or its successor) to the prior health benefit agreements to fund
comprehensive benefits for retirees.3" Under this plan, any company
that had employed presently-retired coal miners would be required to
pay for current health care benefits, even if the company no longer
Arguably, this
participated in the coal mining industry.39
congressionally mandated solution represented an unreasonable
extension of benefits for certain retired miners who had left service
under plans that expressly conditioned future benefits on adequate
funding under the pre-existing funding mechanisms. 40
Pursuant to the funding mechanism selected by Congress, the
Commissioner of Social Security assessed Eastern Enterprises with an
annual premium of five million dollars.41 Rather than simply pay this
assessment, Eastern Enterprises initiated a lawsuit in federal district
34. See The Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486,
106 Stat. 3037 (1992) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701-9722 (1994 & Supp. V

1999)).
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 504-11 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 511-13 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 512-13 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 514-15 (plurality opinion); see §§ 9701, 9701(c)(2)(A), 9706(a).
E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 514-15 (plurality opinion).
Id at 507-09, 514-15 (plurality opinion).
Id at 517 (plurality opinion).
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court seeking a declaration that the new funding scheme obligations
violated either the Takings Clause or the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause.
Alternatively, the company argued that the
Commissioner misinterpreted the Coal Act.4 2 The district court
granted summary judgment for the Commissioner on all three claims,
and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed this
decision. 43
B.

The Divided Supreme Court'sDecision

The Supreme Court divided 4-1-4 on the constitutionality of the
Coal Act's funding scheme. Writing for the plurality, Justice
O'Connor immediately focused upon Eastern Enterprises's takings
claim. Although the "case does not present the 'classi[c] taking' in
which the government directly appropriates private property for its
own use," the plurality held that "economic regulation such as the
Coal Act may nonetheless effect a taking."'
Justice O'Connor recited the three-part test for regulatory
takings enunciated in Penn Central Transportation Co.45 and
subsequently applied by the Supreme Court in regulatory takings
cases.46 Under this test, a reviewing court must consider "[t]he
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant," "the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations," and "the character of the governmental action."'4 7 One
should note, however, that prior to Eastern Enterprises,the Supreme
Court generally has applied Penn Central Transportation Co. only in
the context of cases involving restrictions on the use or enjoyment of
real property, rather than in cases involving straightforward monetary
obligations to the federal government.'
42. Id. (plurality opinion).
43. E. Enters. v. Chater, 110 F.3d 150, 159-62 (1st Cir. 1997), rev'd sub. nom., E.
Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (plurality opinion).
44. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 522-23 (plurality opinion).
45. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
46. See E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 523-24 (plurality opinion) (framing regulatory takings
inquiry in terms of the "economic impact of the regulation, its interference with
reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action").
47. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124; see also PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980) (applying three-part test to hold that permitting members
of the public to engage in free speech activities on private commercial property does not
constitute a taking); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979) (applying
three-part test to hold that the government may not require public access to a privately
owned dredged pond without invoking its eminent domain powers and paying just
compensation).
48. See supratext and accompanying notes 6-12.
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In Justice O'Connor's view, the Supreme Court's task was to
determine whether the Coal Act's funding provisions comported with
basic notions of "justice and fairness."49 If a law imposes "severe
retroactive liability on a limited class of parties that could not have
anticipated the liability, and the extent of that liability is substantially
disproportionate to the parties' experience," the plurality concluded
that it would transgress the Takings Clause."
Applying this test to the facts of the case, Justice O'Connor
found that the Coal Act's economic impact on Eastern Enterprises
(and other affected past and present coal mining companies) was
"considerable" and "substantial." 51 Moreover, "the company is
5' 2
clearly deprived of the amounts it must pay the Combined Fund.
Additional considerations, such as the "disproportionate impact" of
the funding scheme on corporations no longer in the mining business
and the retroactive nature of the funding scheme, merely confirmed
the plurality's finding that the Coal Act's funding obligations
constituted a "taking."53 As Justice O'Connor opined: "[T]he
Constitution does not permit a solution to the problem of funding
miners' benefits that imposes such a disproportionate and severely
retroactive burden upon Eastern." 54
Although Justice O'Connor attempted to cabin the Court's
inquiry with references to notions such as "basic fairness,"
"reasonable investment-backed expectations," "proportionality," and
"retroactivity,"55 at bottom these catch phrases were all really parts of
a larger whole: a generalized inquiry into the fundamental fairness of
the Coal Act's funding provisions. Under Eastern Enterprises, the
gravamen of a regulatory taking is the degree to which the law or
regulation seems to impose costs unfairly and arbitrarily on a
particular class of persons or entities. Generalized inquiries into the
fairness or justice of government actions, at least as a matter of

49. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 523 (plurality opinion).
50. Id. at 528-29 (plurality opinion).
51. Id. at 529 (plurality opinion).
52. Id. (plurality opinion).
53. See id. at 530-35 (plurality opinion).
54. Id. at 536 (plurality opinion). But cf. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428
U.S. 1, 14-16 (1976) (rejecting a substantive due process challenge to a federal law that
imposed a retroactive financial liability on coal mine operators for a portion of the health
care costs associated with treating retired coal miners suffering from black lung disease).
55. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 523-24 (plurality opinion).
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history and precedent, implicate concerns rooted in 6the concept of
due process of law, rather than in the Takings Clause
When recast in this fashion, the Supreme Court's Takings Clause
jurisprudence begins to bear an uncanny resemblance to the Lochnerera instantiation of substantive due process.5 7 As an operational
matter, the Eastern Enterprises plurality opinion tracks Lochner:
instead of ordering "just compensation," the plurality simply strikes
down the offending statute as unfair or irrational. The Takings
Clause is thus transformed from a specific requirement to compensate
persons when government expropriates property for a public purpose
into a generalized guarantee against the enactment of fundamentally
unfair or unjust laws.
It is true, of course, that prior Supreme Court opinions had
articulated and applied this three-factor test (most notably the Penn
Central case).5 It is also true that the Supreme Court, in both prior
and subsequent cases, has held that money, in the form of interest,
59
constitutes "property" for purposes of applying the Takings Clause.
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Eastern Enterprises is
exceptional, however, because it stitches together these two concepts
in a new and problematic fashion.
The cases in the Penn Central line invariably involved restrictions
on the use or enjoyment of real property. The cases involving interest
on bank accounts prohibited direct government expropriations of the
interest earned on the accounts, so that reliance on the three-part

56. See, e.g., Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 146-48 (1938) (rejecting substantive due
process challenge to tax law that imposed a retroactive tax liability and analyzing
taxpayer's claim in terms of the law's fundamental fairness); see also United States v.
Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 30-34 (1994) (citing and applying the rule of Welch and finding a
retroactive tax law insufficiently "harsh and oppressive" to violate the limitations imposed
by the doctrine of substantive due process).
57. See, e.g., Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111-13 (1928); Truax v. Corrigan,
257 U.S. 312, 327-28 (1921); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 13-17 (1915); Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 53-56 (1908); see also Thompson, supra note 19, at 1262-69 (stating
that after Eastern Enterprises "it is hard to see why taxes are not fodder for a takings
analysis"); cf W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391-400 (1937) (repudiating the
Lochner doctrine as applied to laws establishing minimum wage requirements).
58. See Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978); see
also PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-84 (1980) (repeating and
applying the three-factor test).
59. See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160-64 (1980);
see also Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 163-70 (1998) (holding that interest
earned on lawyer-controlled trust accounts constitutes "property" for purposes of applying
the Takings Clause); Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 270 F.3d
180, 185-95 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that expropriation of interest on lawyer trust accounts
constitutes a per se taking and declining to apply the Penn Central analysis).
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Penn Centraltest was unnecessary to the disposition of the case.60 By
transposing the Penn Central test into a new and different context,
Justice O'Connor, at least potentially, has radically expanded the
scope of the Takings Clause into a new Lochner-esque weapon
deployable against disfavored social and economic legislation.
That said, the plurality expressly eschewed any reliance on the
doctrine of substantive due process to support its conclusion.
"Because we have determined that the third tier of the Coal Act's
allocation scheme violates the Takings Clause as applied to Eastern,
we need not address Eastern's due process claim. '61 In light of the
"severe, disproportionate, and extremely retroactive burden on
Eastern," the Takings Clause provided a sufficient basis for providing
the requested injunctive relief.62
Justice Kennedy concurred in part and dissented in part from the
plurality's holding, providing the critical fifth vote to disallow the
Coal Act's funding scheme. 63 Although he agreed with the plurality
that the retroactive nature of the law and the significant financial
burden it imposed on Eastern Enterprises were germane to a proper
analysis of Eastern's claim, he preferred to rely upon the substantive
aspect of the Due Process Clause to analyze the constitutionality of
the Coal Act's funding provisions. In Kennedy's view, the imposition
of severe retroactive funding obligations was sufficiently arbitrary to
violate the Constitution. 64 "[D]ue process protection for property
must be understood to incorporate our settled tradition against
retroactive laws of great severity."'65 The Coal Act's funding
provisions, at least as applied to Eastern Enterprises, "represent[ed]
the Legislature has exceeded the
one of the rare instances where
'66
process.
due
by
imposed
limits
60. No serious person would disagree with the proposition that a direct government
expropriation of interest earned on a savings account represents a "taking." The only real
question would be whether the facts and circumstances are such that the government's
seizure of the money, in violation of the general common law rule that interest follows
principal, should be ignored or excused. See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies,449 U.S. at
160-64 (holding that interest on monies held by the court for the benefit of bankrupt's
creditors constitutes "property" for purposes of Takings Clause and cannot be seized by
the clerk of court to cover operating expenses in light of rule that "interest ...follows...
principal").
61. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498,538 (1998) (plurality opinion).
62. Id. (plurality opinion).
63. See id. at 539, 540-550 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in
part).
64. Id. at 547-50 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
65. Id. at 549 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
66. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).

2002]

EXPROPRIA TORY INTENT

Four Justices dissented from the invalidation of the Coal Act's
funding provisions. 67 Writing for the dissenting Justices, Justice
Breyer agreed with Justice Kennedy that substantive due process,
rather than the Takings Clause, provided the relevant decisional
principle: "The Constitution's Takings Clause does not apply." He
went on to explain that the Takings Clause does not limit the scope of
government action, but merely conditions such action on
compensation to adversely affected citizens. Because the federal
government did not seek to deprive Eastern Enterprises of any
specific, identified property interest, the funding scheme did not
effect a "taking" of Eastern Enterprises's property.69
In Justice Breyer's view, "there is no need to torture the Takings
Clause to fit this case" because "[t]he question involved-the
potential unfairness of retroactive liability-finds a natural home in
the Due Process Clause, a Fifth Amendment neighbor."7 Applying
the Due Process Clause, Justice Breyer did not find the Coal Act's
funding provisions to be sufficiently arbitrary or unfair to warrant
invalidation. 71 He reached this conclusion because "the relationship
between Eastern and the payments demanded by the Coal Act is
special enough to pass the Constitution's fundamental fairness test."'72

II. PANDORA'S Box AND THE POTENTIALLY INFINITE REACH OF
THE TAKINGS CLAUSE UNDER JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S REASONING IN
EASTERN ENTERPRISES

Perhaps unwittingly, Justice O'Connor's Eastern Enterprises
plurality opinion threatens to open a veritable Pandora's box. By
divorcing the Penn Central test from its real property moorings and
recharacterizing it as a generalized inquiry into the fundamental
fairness of the government action in question, the opinion easily
could serve as the basis for a rejuvenation of Lochner-like review of
economic and social legislation. This section will explore in some
detail the wisdom of turning the Takings Clause into a general
mandate to strike down health, safety, and environmental laws and
will consider some possible alternative readings of the Takings Clause
that might be less likely to produce such an untoward result.
67. See id at 553 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg).
68. Id. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
69. See id.at 554-56 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
70. Id.at 556 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
71. See id2 at 558-68 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
72. Id.at 559 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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A. Searchingfor PrincipledLimits to the Takings Clause
The problem of defining a "taking" has vexed the federal courts
since Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon.73 Taken to its logical
extreme, any requirement to pay money to the government could
constitute a taking. Moreover, Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion
in Eastern Enterprisesdoes little to preclude such a broad claim.
Justice O'Connor's test features three factors that lower courts
must consider. The Eastern Enterprisesthree-factor test requires a

reviewing court to consider the "economic impact of the regulation,
its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and
the character of the government action."'74

The reviewing court should be particularly sensitive to schemes
that "impose[ ] severe retroactive liability on a limited class of parties
that could not have anticipated the liability," especially when "the
extent of that liability is substantially disproportionate to the parties'
experience."' Any revenue measure or regulation that imposes a
scheme of nontrivial civil fines or forfeitures potentially creates a
severe economic impact.

Whether this impact comports with

"reasonable, investment-backed expectations" would largely be in the
76
eye of the beholder.

The final consideration, the "character of the government
action," is an amorphous concept. Judges are clever wordsmiths, and
73. 260 U.S. 393,413-16 (1922).
74. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 523-24 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
75. Id. at 528-29 (plurality opinion).
76. As a home owner with a substantial outstanding mortgage, I would certainly
consider it to be a transgression of my "reasonable, investment-backed expectations" were
Congress to repeal the deduction for home mortgage loan interest payments. If Congress
were to make such a change, I could potentially take some solace in the plurality's
willingness to sit as a council of review over such legislation insofar as it might arm me
with a serious takings claim. Of course, this argument runs counter to the acceptable ways
of looking at governmental regulation. If Congress decided to abolish the income tax in
favor of a flat sales or consumption tax, the implementing legislation should not be subject
to a serious Takings Clause challenge. The Supreme Court should not interpret the
Takings Clause to repeal the inherent authority Congress possesses to make basic
economic and social policies. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 15254 (1938); Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 306-08 (1935). It would
be particularly egregious for the federal courts to deploy the Takings Clause to thwart
congressional revisions of the tax code. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 ("All Bills for
raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may
propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills."); id art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The
Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises ...
id. amend. XVI ("The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without
regard to any census or enumeration.").
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one harbors the nagging suspicion that virtually any law creating a
monetary or regulatory obligation could be characterized as either
eminently reasonable or outrageously unfair without much judicial
77

heavy lifting.

It is difficult to see how this explication of the test meaningfully
limits the scope or bite of the Takings Clause. For example, a change

in marginal tax rates could support a plausible argument under each
factor. Consider, for purpose of illustration, a federal law raising the
highest marginal tax rate on personal income from thirty-nine to fifty
percent. Holding all other tax policies constant, this would require
some higher income taxpayers to surrender more money in order to
satisfy their annual federal income tax obligations. Since the
inception of the federal income tax in 1913,78 no credible person has
suggested that federal income tax obligations transgress the Takings
Clause.7 9

Yet, as a matter of logic, why should we expect the federal courts
to treat an obligation to pay taxes any differently from an obligation
to make an involuntary financial contribution to fund retired workers'
health care benefits?O

If the Takings Clause applies to any

enactment that "takes" a single dollar, as Justice O'Connor suggests,
77. See Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 793-97, 804-15, 819-22
(1983). Again, one must keep in mind that although this three-part test predates Eastern
Enterprises, its application in the context of a simple money obligation breaks significant
new ground. See supra text and accompanying notes 45-48.
78. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XVI.
79. On the other hand, one might plausibly argue that a particular tax is so
fundamentally arbitrary or unjust as to violate substantive due process. See Usery v.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 14-20 (1976).
80. As a matter of economic logic, the transactions are largely, if not completely,
identical. Suppose Congress simply passed a special tax applicable to any entity that
operates, or formerly operated, a coal mine. Pursuant to this special tax, such enterprises
would pay higher marginal corporate tax rates than other kinds of corporations; the
monies generated from this special tax would be paid into the U.S. Treasury, without any
special earmarks. Concurrently, Congress might appropriate, from general treasury funds,
monies sufficient to fund health care benefits for retired coal miners. This arrangement
would duplicate the result generated by the funding provisions of the Coal Act-the only
difference is the indirect, as opposed to direct, earmarking of the funds generated from the
special tax. Plainly, one would have to exalt form over substance to suggest that a general
revenue obligation applied to one sector of the national economy does not transgress the
Takings Clause because Congress does not dedicate the resulting revenues, but an
identical financial burden would transgress the Takings Clause were Congress to mandate
that the revenues be directly used to pay for the health care benefits. Cf. New Energy Co.
v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,278 (1988) (invalidating on Dormant Commerce Clause grounds
a discriminatory tax credit program for Ohio-produced ethanol, but permitting states to
maintain direct subsidy programs for ethanol producers that would have an identical
economic effect).
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then virtually any federal or state enactment creating a monetary
obligation must potentially survive scrutiny under the Takings
Clause."' After all, the hypothetical tax statute "takes" money just as
effectively as the Coal Act's provisions; it does so to promote a public
purpose (the funding of the federal government's operations); and it
2
does so without providing compensation for the taking.
One could distinguish the facts in Eastern Enterprisesbecause a
change in the marginal tax rates is not necessarily retroactive in all
cases. Of course, a change in tax rates could be retroactive in its first
year of operation. Unless Congress makes the changes effective only
in the following tax year, a law passed midyear and effective for the
current tax year would have retroactive effects (indeed, absent
changes in withholding amounts, some taxpayers might face penalties
for underwithholding federal income tax payments).Y3 In a larger
sense, though, it is far from clear that a lack of retroactivity, by itself,
would automatically save a law from Takings Clause scrutiny under
the plurality's approach.
81. One might argue that the Sixteenth Amendment implicitly repeals the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the right against uncompensated takings implicit in
the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of "due process of law." See U.S. CONST. amend
XVI ("The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever
source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to
any census or enumeration."); cf. id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 ("No capitation, or other direct, Tax
shall be laid, unless in proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to
be taken."). The Supreme Court has rejected an implied repeal of the Twenty-First
Amendment, see 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 514-16 (1996), and
there is no compelling reason to suppose that the Takings Clause would fare differently.
The best counterexample involves the Fourteenth Amendment's repeal of state sovereign
immunity from federal court jurisdiction. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 54-73 (1996). The Fourteenth Amendment, in contrast to the Sixteenth
Amendment, establishes obligations on the states that might be unenforceable in the
absence of federal court jurisdiction over claims arising under it and legislation enacted to
enforce it. No such fundamental incompatibility exists with respect to the Sixteenth
Amendment and the Takings Clause.
82. One might claim that government actions often convey benefits to the citizenry.
So-called "givings" are governmental actions that disproportionately enhance or increase
the value of some, but not all, citizens' property. See Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 618 (2001). Although the topic of "givings"
deserves more scholarly attention, see id. at 549-55, 618, there is no necessary
correspondence between the beneficiaries of givings and those particularly harmed by
government regulations. Nor, under the regulatory takings doctrine, should a generalized
benefit enjoyed by the citizenry as a whole satisfy the government's obligation to
compensate a small group of exceptionally affected property owners.
83. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 VA. L. REV.
277, 314-15 (2001) (noting that "the taxing power remains the neglected comer of the
takings triangle" and suggesting that some tax schemes should be deemed "takings,"
depending on their precise manner of operation and the property interests that they
affect).
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The Eastern Enterprises plurality emphasized the lack of
"proportionality" between the amount assessed against former
employers in the coal mining industry and the employers'
expectations regarding such funding obligations. 84 At its essence,
Justice O'Connor's opinion stands for little more than the proposition
that the Takings Clause prohibits the government from imposing
unfair financial obligations. Whether a particular obligation is
sufficiently unfair to require "just compensation" is, of course, a
matter committed to the sound discretion of the federal judiciary.
Ironically enough, the Supreme Court had already faced such
questions in the context of substantive due process challenges to
retroactive forms of taxation. In this largely analogous context, the
Supreme Court has explained that "[i]n each case it is necessary to
consider the nature of the tax and the circumstances in which it is laid
before it can be said that its retroactive application is so harsh and
oppressive as to transgress the constitutional limitation."' 5 The Welch
court cautioned that "a tax is not necessarily unconstitutional because
retroactive. 8' 6 On the facts at bar, the Welch court found no
substantive due process violation: "Since no citizen enjoys immunity
from [the] burden [of taxation], its retroactive imposition does not
necessarily infringe due process, and to challenge the present tax it is
not enough to point out that the taxable event, the receipt of income,
antedated the statute."'
Thus, in the context of substantive due
process, retroactivity alone does not automatically trigger a finding of
a violation.
More recently still, the Supreme Court has rejected a substantive
due process challenge to statutorily imposed, retroactive funding
requirements on the former employers of retired coal miners who
suffer from black lung (also known as pneumoconiosis). The
Supreme Court considered the mine operators' objection to the
retroactive funding obligation, but declined to grant relief.88 The
Court explained:
[iut is by now well established that legislative Acts adjusting
the burdens and benefits of economic life come to the Court
with a presumption of constitutionality, and that the burden
84. See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498,529-37 (1998) (plurality opinion).
85. Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134,147 (1938).
86. Id. at 146.
87. Id. at 147.
88. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 14-20 (1976). In light of Eastern
Enterprises, it would appear that the plaintiffs' lawyers in Turner Elkhorn Mining simply
litigated their claim under the wrong constitutional clause.
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is on one complaining of a due process violation to establish
that 8 the
legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational
9
way.

Moreover, "legislation readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful
solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations. This is true
even though the effect of the legislation is to impose a new duty or
liability based on past acts."'
The Supreme Court did not find the retroactivity claim
meritorious in this context: "the imposition of liability for the effects
of disabilities bred in the past is justified as a rational measure to
spread the costs of the employees' disabilities to those who have
profited from the fruits of their labor-the operators and coal
consumers." 91 In principle, the same result should have applied in the
context of the Coal Act's funding requirements for retired miners'
health benefits.9
B.

The PotentialConsequencesof Opening Pandora'sBox: The
Takings Clause Run Amok
Under the logic of the plurality opinion in Eastern Enterprises,
the Takings Clause potentially provides relief where substantive due
process would not; litigants may attack any legislation or regulation
that requires the payment of money as a Takings Clause violation. If
successful, the offending government (federal or state) must pay "just
compensation" for the unlawful taking. At the risk of redundancy, it
bears noting that this turns the text of the Takings Clause on its head:
"[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation." 93 Under the logic of Justice O'Connor's approach,
the private property at issue, money or federal reserve notes, having
been taken for a "public use," triggers an obligation on the part of the
government to provide "just compensation," presumably federal
reserve notes of a sort fungible with those taken.
The linguistic syntax of the Takings Clause screams out against
this result. The language, on its face, plainly anticipates a sort of
exchange: the government deprives someone of a property interest
(whether tangible or intangible property), it does so for a legitimate
89. Id. at 15.
90. Id. at 16 (citations omitted).
91. Id. at 18.
92. See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 557, 566-68 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(citing and applying Usery when analyzing the fundamental fairness of the retroactive
funding obligation imposed on Eastern Enterprises).
93. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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reason, and it thereby incurs an obligation to pay fair market value
for the property at issue.94 Although it is true that money, whether in
the form of federal reserve notes, bank credits, gold ingots, or Euros,

constitutes "property," it is quite silly to consider a general financial
obligation to government, such as the income tax, as a government

"taking" of the funds or credits used to satisfy the obligation.
The reason for this distinction relates to the intent, or purpose,

behind the government's actions. When a state government employs
the power of eminent domain to take title to a parcel of land, thereby
displacing a private citizen whose home sits upon the land, the
government possesses expropriatory intent; it intends to take and

possess a particular thing in order to accomplish a specific goal or
objective. When government enacts general revenue measures, and
most regulations, it lacks this expropriatory intent-government is
indifferent as to how a taxpayer obtains the funds to satisfy the
obligation. The taxpayer could use cash reserves, take out a loan, or

even sell the Matisse. The source of the funds is a matter of almost
complete indifference. 95
In these circumstances, the requisite
expropriatory intent is utterly absent.

Indeed, taken to its logical conclusion, the Federal Reserve
Board's Open Market Committee arguably "takes" property every
time it raises or lowers interest rates. The value of any interestbearing financial instrument will ebb and flow with changes in the
Federal Reserve Bank's interest rates. 96 These changes, although not
retroactive, are undoubtedly inconsistent with at least some

reasonable, investment-backed expectations and can produce severe,
unanticipated effects on the value of existing securities. 97 Yet, one
94. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-63 (1980); cf. Krotoszynski, supra
note 15, at 606-07 (arguing that substantive due process, rather than the Takings Clause,
should serve as the basis for constitutional challenges to social or economic legislation that
adversely affects property interests when the gravamen of the challenge is that the law is
fundamentally unfair or unjust).
95. If one sold powder cocaine in order to obtain the funds, the federal government
might lodge an objection. See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE
LAW 364-86 (1997) (describing and critiquing the federal government's enforcement and
punishment of crimes associated with cocaine and positing racial bias as the real reason for
differential treatment of defendants convicted of offenses involving crack, rather than
powder, forms of cocaine).
96. See MARTIN MAYER, THE FED: THE INSIDE STORY OF HoW THE WORLD'S
MOST POWERFUL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION DRIvEs THE MARKET 3-27 (2001).

97. See Richard W. Rahn, Editorial, Defeating Deflation, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2001,
at A20 (noting that commodities producers acquired debt in order to finance expansion
under "the reasonable expectation that the Federal Reserve would maintain stable
money" and "have been less able to service their debt" due to the Federal Reserve's
failure to supply adequate money).
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would like to think that the federal government can conduct
monetary policy without potentially incurring infinite liabilities under
the Takings Clause.98
C. ClosingPandora'sBox: Toward a PrincipledLimitation on the
Scope of the Takings Clause
In order to avoid such untoward results, the Supreme Court
should modify its regulatory takings jurisprudence to fit this proposed
model by requiring a showing of expropriatory intent as an essential
element of a regulatory takings claim. For example, consider a
general revenue law that affects millions of citizens in an identical
fashion: suppose that Congress repeals the personal income tax
deduction for interest paid on a home mortgage loan.99 Abolition of
the home mortgage interest deduction would provoke a hue and cry
from many federal taxpayers, but government would be largely
indifferent as to how any given taxpayer obtained the funds to satisfy
the increased federal income tax obligation. No regulatory taking
occurs because the law affects a huge number of people in an
indiscriminate fashion and government is indifferent to the means
used to satisfy the obligation (for example, the government lacks
expropriatory intent). Moreover, the governmental regulation does
not relate so much to the property itself as to conduct or behavior
associated with the property (in the example, the abolition of a de
facto subsidy for home ownership that would exert negative pressure
on the value of residential real estate).
Current regulatory takings jurisprudence focuses only on the first
proposition-the broad-based effects of the law-and ignores
completely the second. 1 0 To allow this gloss to capture the scope of
regulatory takings is too imprecise. A reviewing court should not find
a regulatory taking when a law or regulation affects a small number of

98. In the context of legislation voiding gold clauses in pre-existing contracts, the
Supreme Court simply chalked the financial losses associated with the change in monetary
policy up to the risk of doing business. See Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 294
U.S. 240, 306-11 (1935). Whether this same analysis would hold true today is uncertain in
light of the plurality's approach in EasternEnterprises.
99. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 163(a), (h) (West 1988 & Supp. 2001) (providing for the
deductibility of interest paid on a qualified home mortgage).
100. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448,2457-58 (2001); Lucas v. S. C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014-15 (1992); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 175-80 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-25 (1978).
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entities exceptionally, but government lacks the requisite
expropriatory intent. 10 1
For example, regulations implementing the Clean Air Act might
affect only a few dozen industrial facilities. Failure to comply with
the regulations might result in the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") imposing significant monetary penalties on the
noncompliant facilities. 1°2 In some cases, the cost of retrofitting the
affected plants might exceed the value of the refurbished, compliant

facility.10 3

In economic terms, the regulation would destroy

101. It bears noting that the Supreme Court, at least in the distant past, once
considered the government's subjective intent an important factor in Takings Clause cases.
See Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341, 345 (1925) ("There is no finding as a fact that
the government took the business, or that what it did was intended as a taking. If the
business was destroyed, the destruction was an unintended incident of the taking of the
land."); Tempel v. United States, 248 U.S. 121, 130 (1918) ("Under such circumstances it
must be assumed that the government intended to take and to make compensation for any
property taken, so as to afford the basis for an implied promise."); Peabody v. United
States, 231 U.S. 530, 538-39 (1913) ("But, in this view, the question remains whether it
satisfactorily appears that the servitude has been imposed; that is, whether enough is
shown to establish an intention on the part of the government to impose it."); see also
Angelle v. State, 34 So. 2d 321, 323 (La. 1948) ("We think that the statement refers
exclusively to the power of eminent domain, i.e., the intentional or purposeful
expropriation or appropriation of private property for a public use or convenience.").
These cases clearly demonstrate that a showing of intentional expropriation can be
successfully incorporated into takings analyses.
102. See David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond
Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 545, 554-55 (1997); Clifford
Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of Environmental
Enforcement, 71 S.CAL. L. REV. 1181,1186-90 (1998); Michael Levinson, Note, Deterring
Air Polluters Through Economically Efficient Sanctions: A Proposalfor Amending the
Clean Air Act, 32 STAN. L. REV. 807, 812-14 (1980); Samantha Levine, Gettingthat Clean
Thing: "Yes" to Air Quality Rules, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 12, 2001, at 39, 39;
see also Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The EndangeredSpecies AcL A Case Study In Takings
and Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305, 306-07, 343-47 (1997) (analyzing and critiquing
potential Takings Clause challenges to the enforcement of the Endangered Species Act).
See generally Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1523, 1524-38,
1550-52 (1984) (modeling the economic effects of monetary sanctions as an enforcement
tool for environmental protection laws).
103. Environmental laws mandating health-based, as opposed to cost/benefit,
regulations, such as the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671q (West 1995 & Supp.
2001), are particularly likely to produce such results. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409
(1994); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 121 S.Ct. 903, 908-11 (2001) (holding that the
EPA may not consider the costs of implementation when writing air quality standards
under section 109 of the Clean Air Act); Am. Lung Ass'n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388, 388-89
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (requiring the EPA to establish health- and technology-based air quality
standards under the Clean Air Act sufficient to protect particularly vulnerable persons
from air pollution); Lead Indust. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1148-53 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(noting that "[n]othing in [the Clean Air Act's] language suggests that the Administrator
is to consider economic or technological feasibility in setting ambient air quality
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completely the value of the enterprise as a widget factory. Under

contemporary takings jurisprudence, the owners could challenge the
validity of the EPA's regulations as a taking: the EPA may regulate,
but it must pay the fair market value of the plant prior to the
adoption of the new emissions standards. Yet, on the hypothetical
facts, the government is regulating solely to advance legitimate health
and safety concerns; in no meaningful sense is the government
attempting to use regulations to expropriate private property (for
example, seize and control private property for its own benefit).
Embracing a doctrinal approach to the Takings Clause that would
create potentially limitless liability for government entities seeking to
curb pollution through regulation makes little sense if the community
is supposedly empowered to enact laws that regulate both behavior
and property for the common good.
Professor John Hart has persuasively argued that the Framers
did not anticipate that regulatory takings would be compensable
under the Takings Clause. 1°4 Little good would be accomplished by
simply rehashing his excellent historical arguments. Obviously,
however, the contemporary Supreme Court does not view the original
understanding of the Takings Clause as placing an absolute limit on
its scope. 105
standards"); see also Mark Seidenfeld & Jim Rossi, The False Promise of the "New"
Nondeledgation Doctrine,76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 2-4 (2000).
104. See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings
Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1252-57, 1281-93 (1996) (arguing that historical
record, at least during the colonial period, supports the view that legislation may limit or
burden land use in order to promote public good, and observing absence of any legal
doctrine even roughly approximating the regulatory takings doctrine during this period)
[hereinafter Hart, Colonial Land Use Law]; John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early
Republic and the OriginalMeaning of the Takings Clause, 94 Nw. U. L. REV.1099, 10991102, 1107-54 (2000) (describing early land use policies during the era of the Federal
Convention and noting the utter absence of the regulatory takings doctrine in state or
federal courts) [hereinafter Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic]; see also John F.
Hart, Forfeiture of Unimproved Land in the Early Republic, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 435,
448-51 (arguing that historical evidence does not support contemporary Supreme Court's
regulatory takings doctrine and positing that such claims should be analyzed under the
doctrine of substantive due process).
105. Ironically, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, among the Supreme Court's most
ardent supporters of textualism and originalism in interpreting the Constitution, abandon
their loyalty to these interpretive schools when Takings Clause questions appear at bar.
Emerson may have been right to suppose that a foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of
small minds, but the failure of either Justice Scalia or Justice Thomas to explain this lapse
in their textualistloriginalist faith is disturbing. Given this state of affairs, one would be
hard pressed to refute an inference that these Justices simply refuse to follow their
ostensibly preferred interpretive rules in this context because, in Takings Clause cases,
such an approach simply will not support the substantive outcomes that they prefer. Cf
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
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Notwithstanding the fact that both text and logic support a more
limited reading of the Takings Clause, in light of Eastern Enterprises,
it appears doubtful that a majority of the contemporary Supreme
Court will limit the scope of the regulatory takings doctrine in favor
of a renewed commitment to meaningful substantive due process
review of government actions that adversely affect private property
interests. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court could, were it so inclined,
reorient its regulatory takings jurisprudence in a fashion that would
make it at least somewhat more intellectually honest.
At a minimum, the expropriatory intent requirement would shift
most litigation alleging that a particular government action is
fundamentally unfair or irrational to either the Due Process Clauses
or the Equal Protection Clause. 106 Analysis of the basic fairness of
government action, as a matter of text and logic, would be better
accommodated as an incident of the due process of law. After all, the
Takings Clause, on its face, does not purport to place any substantive
limits on government action, but instead conditions such action on the
payment of "just compensation." Due process of law, on the other
hand, limits not only the procedures by which government acts, but
the very ability of government to pursue certain ends.107 Although
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do
not textually proscribe arbitrary or unjust governmental action, since
at least Palko v. Connecticut,°8 the Supreme Court has deployed
these clauses to protect fundamental rights "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty."109 One such unenumerated constitutional right
flowing from the substantive aspect of the Due Process Clauses is the
right to be free from utterly arbitrary or unjust government actions. 110
Accordingly, utterly arbitrary or unjust government actions affecting
3-47 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (arguing that textualism, coupled with originalism,
represents the most legitimate approach to interpreting ambiguous legal texts, including
both statutes and the Constitution); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U.
CIN. L. REV.849,854-57,861-64 (1989) (same).
106. See infra text and accompanying notes 209-18; cf Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech,
528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000) (holding that an arbitrary and irrational denial of access to
municipal water service on equal terms as other would-be customers violates the Equal
Protection Clause, even if the plaintiff constitutes a "class of one").
107. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848-51 (1992) (joint opinion)
(explaining and applying the concept of due process of law as an affirmative limitation on
government power to regulate certain important autonomy interests); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968) (noting that due process of law protects rights
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, whether or not enumerated in the Bill of

Rights).
108. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).

109. Id at 325.
110. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,845-47 (1998).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

property interests would give rise to a substantive due process
claim."1 '

Moreover, the ad hoe nature of the Supreme Court's current
regulatory takings doctrine is profoundly embarrassing. The Justices
have repeatedly disclaimed the existence of any specific test or verbal
formula that absolutely limits the scope of this doctrine."2 By way of
contrast, the Justices have settled on a fairly predictable analytical
approach to substantive due process claims.

Laws burdening

"fundamental" rights, as identified through an examination of history
and tradition, require special justification from the government to be
deemed constitutional, whereas laws burdening "non-fundamental"
liberty or property interests are only subject to rational basis
review. 13 Lower court judges and government officials have a very
good idea of what substantive due process requires and can identify
and apply the appropriate tests with relative ease. This promotes
determinacy in the law, a value generally associated with legitimacy
and fairness. The Supreme Court's highly contextualized, ad hoc
approach to deciding regulatory takings cases arguably disserves
these values.

The expropriatory intent approach would banish the prospect of
a revitalized Lochner doctrine in the guise of regulatory takings
doctrine (an objective that most observers would deem a worthy
one)" 4 and would reorient Takings Clause jurisprudence along lines
111. As Justice Souter has explained, "Since the time of our early explanations of due
process, we have understood the core of the concept to be protection against arbitrary
[government] action." Id at 845.
112. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 2457 (2001) (explaining that
"[s]ince Mahon, we have given some, but not too specific, guidance to courts confronted
with deciding whether a particular government action goes too far and effects a regulatory
taking"); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (noting that "[i]n 70odd years of succeeding 'regulatory takings' jurisprudence, we have generally eschewed
any "set formula" for determining how far is too far" (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (noting that "this Court, quite simply has been
unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require
that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather
than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons" and describing regulatory
takings analyses as "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries"))); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590, 594 (1962) ("There is no set formula to determine where a regulation ends and a
taking begins.").
113. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-22 (1997); Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 191-95 (1986); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500-505
(1977) (plurality opinion); see also Krotoszynski, supra note 15, at 567-68, 583-90
(describing and critiquing the Supreme Court's bifurcated approach to due process
analysis).
114. But cf. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 4, at 99-100,295-303,314-29 (arguing for a
very broad interpretation of the Takings Clause to prohibit such things as a progressive
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more consistent with its historical and textual roots. At the end of the
day, one reasonably may ask why, as a matter of constitutional
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court should read the Takings Clause to
both replicate and recreate the guarantee of fundamentally fair
governance encompassed in the very notion of "due process of law."
The answer to such an inquiry is easy: The federal courts should not
torture the Takings Clause in a facile effort to avoid any appearance
of conjuring Lochner's ghost.
These considerations notwithstanding, in a very limited number
of cases, government regulation can serve as an effective proxy for a
de facto exercise of eminent domain. n If government regulates the
use of an extremely limited class of property in ways that virtually
preclude any economically viable uses, a reasonable person could
infer from the circumstances that the government's intent is not really
regulatory, but rather is to expropriate the property for a
governmental use.
A conscientious federal judge could infer
expropriatory intent from circumstances that belie any plausible
regulatory intent.
Suppose a county government prohibits any building permits for
beachfront homes unless and until a property owner seeking a
building permit cedes, in perpetuity, an easement for a park along the
high tide line, plus five feet.1 6 The regulation essentially conditions
any home improvements on the creation of a public park on the
property owner's land. The ordinance effectively requires the
landowner to donate the strip of land to the government. The county
government does not directly condemn the land to create a coastal
park; instead, it attempts to use regulatory powers (in this case zoning
and building permit laws) to effect a land grab.
Contemporary takings law would prohibit such action absent
compensation at fair market value for the land.17 Government
undoubtedly has the power to take the land and put it to public use; it
just cannot take the land indirectly and refuse to pay fair market
value for it. Nollan,"8 Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastalCouncil,"9 and
Dolan v. City of Tigard2 ° all demonstrate that government cannot
income tax, federal labor regulations, and other health, safety, and environmental
protection laws and regulations).
115. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413-15 (1922).
116. These facts reasonably approximate the facts at issue in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825,827-28 (1987).
117. See id at 831,834-37,841-42.
118. Id.
119. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).

120. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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attempt to coerce property rights incident to zoning or permitting
decisions.' 2 ' That said, none of these cases makes plain that the
government's expropriatory intent drives the result. The majority
opinions in these cases address concerns such as "proportionality"
between the burden imposed in exchange for the benefit and require
a "reasonable fit" between conditions on land use and the effects of
land use.l' 3
The presence of expropriatory intent, however, would provide a
stronger foundation for the results in at least some of these cases.124
When government exercises regulatory power, but circumstances
indicate an expropriatory intent, the Takings Clause should mandate
the payment of "just compensation." This result does not obtain
because a regulation that affects property values constitutes a
"taking" as a matter of course. Rather, the rule reflects a practical
judgment that government is not really regulating at all. When
regulation serves as a mere pretext for expropriation, the Takings
Clause should protect the economic interests of a property owner.
On the other hand, when government lacks expropriatory intent, the
fact that regulation imposes financial burdens should not be a
sufficient condition to support a valid takings claim.
D. The Theory Applied: A PreliminaryReassessment of Eastern
Enterprises
Returning to Eastern Enterprises, the problem with Justice
O'Connor's logic seems clear:
Congress did not possess
expropriatory intent with respect to the funds used to provide health
benefits to retired coal miners and their dependents. Congress was
utterly indifferent to the means Eastern Enterprises used to satisfy its
five million dollar obligation. The Coal Act might have been
arbitrary, unfair, grossly retroactive-a thoroughly awful piece of
121. See id. at 383-96 (holding that a city's conditional approval of a building permit on
the dedication of a portion of the property for flood control and traffic improvements
constitutes a taking); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1020-32 (remanding because a regulation that
prohibits a beachfront landowner from building residential homes affects property value);
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841-42 (holding that California may not condition a building permit
upon granting an easement; rather it must use its eminent domain power and pay for the
easement).
122. But cf Peabody v. United States, 231 U.S. 530, 538-39 (1913) (requiring proof of
intent to deprive a property owner of full enjoyment of her property as an essential
element of a takings claim); see also Tempel v. United States, 248 U.S. 121, 130 (1918)
(stating intent requirement and finding that government possessed intent to expropriate
based on circumstantial evidence).
123. See infratext and accompanying notes 163-208.
124. See infratext and accompanying notes 209-18.
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legislative craftsmanship all-around. The Coal Act was not, however,

a taking.'25
Whether the Coal Act was sufficiently arbitrary to transgress the
substantive aspect of the Due Process Clause is a matter over which
reasonable minds could-and did--differ. Justice Kennedy believed
that the imposition of severe retroactive financial obligations
constituted a fundamentally unfair course of government conduct. 2 6

As such, it violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
guarantee of non-arbitrary governance. 127
The four dissenting Justices, led by Justice Breyer, agreed that

substantive due process framed the relevant constitutional question,
but disagreed with Justice Kennedy about whether the Coal Act's
funding scheme was fundamentally unjust."28 Because the employers
anticipated some sort of ongoing funding obligation for the retirees'
health benefits, the Coal Act's financial obligations were hardly
utterly unforeseeable. Moreover, the employers benefited directly
from the labors of the retirees in question, and the funding scheme

required payments only for the workers Eastern Enterprises
employed at its own mines.
Whether Justice Kennedy or Justice Breyer has the better of the
argument over the merits of the substantive due process claim, they
125. In contrast to the funding provisions of the Coal Act, one could imagine a
hypothetical law that actually would reflect expropriatory intent with respect to a
particular sum of money. Suppose, incident to a war effort, that Congress wishes to raise
funds to pay for troops, equipment, and munitions. Rather than simply raising taxes to
fund these expenses, and distrusting the wisdom of relying on the innate patriotism of the
nation's citizens, Congress passes a law requiring corporations with cash reserves in excess
of $100 million to purchase at least $50 million of government bonds bearing an annual
interest rate of only one percent. Let us further assume that, at the time Congress enacts
the law, the prevailing interest rates for federal securities of the sort in question hovers
around the four percent mark. On these facts, a taking has occurred: the federal
government possesses expropriatory intent with respect to the corporate cash reserve
accounts. Moreover, the government has failed to provide just compensation for the
taking (for example, market interest rates on the involuntary bond purchases). Congress
could, of course, simply raise corporate tax rates to achieve the same net financial results.
This alternative approach should not, however, trigger a Takings Clause claim. Thus, the
means the government selects to achieve its objectives should play an important role in
determining the viability of a takings claim.
126. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 547-50 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part).
127. See id. at 549 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part)
("The case before us presents one of the rare instances where the Legislature has
exceeded the limits imposed by due process."). See generally Symposium, When Does
Retroactivity Cross the Line?: Winstar, Eastern Enterprises, and Beyond, 51 ALA. L REv.
933 (2000) (analyzing and critiquing the Supreme Court's use of substantive due process in
recent cases to restrict the use of retroactive state and federal laws).
128. See E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 553-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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were both correct to reject the Takings Clause as the root of Eastern
Enterprises's constitutional objection to the Coal Act's funding
scheme. Perhaps if Justice Kennedy or Justice Breyer had identified
the absence of expropriatory intent in their respective analyses of the
problem, the plurality would have been somewhat less free to
recreate the Takings Clause as a font of general judicial review of
economic, environmental, and social legislation affecting property
interests (meaning virtually all such legislation).
There is, of course, another aspect of this problem that bears
noting. The Takings Clause mandates an automatic remedy; if a
plaintiff shows that private property has been taken, she is entitled to
receive "just compensation," 12 9 or fair market value, for the property
at issue. Even if government only displaces the property owner
temporarily, it must pay fair market value for the use of the property
on a temporally limited basis. 3 Thus, the Takings Clause is a very
plaintiff-friendly constitutional provision. 3 ' There is good reason for
this: when government exercises its powers of eminent domain to
dispossess a private citizen of a property interest, the law should
afford the affected citizen a strong, virtually automatic remedy. On
such facts, an award of "just compensation" would be eminently
reasonable. The analysis should be somewhat different, however,
when a citizen is upset about the financial effects of economic or
social legislation on her property. If government had to compensate
citizens whenever new legislation had such an impact, the business of
democratic self-government would grind to a halt.
Essentially, the mere existence of pre-existing property rights
would estop the government from making changes in the existing
laws. Not even the Justices comprising the Eastern Enterprises
plurality would be likely to embrace this position. Yet, full

129. U.S. CONST. amend V.
130. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304,317-20 (1987).
131. Of course, a careful observer will recognize the absurdity of a true Takings Clause
remedy in Eastern Enterprises: rather than invalidating the funding provisions of the Coal
Act, the Supreme Court should have ordered the Social Security Administration to pay
"just compensation" to Eastern Enterprises for the uncompensated taking. Strictly
speaking, the appropriate remedy for the ersatz taking Eastern Enterprises suffered would
have been a refund of the monies paid to the government, plus interest at prevailing
market rates. This result, although fully and facially consistent with the text of the
Takings Clause, was too ridiculous even for Justice O'Connor, who instead simply voided
the funding mechanism in question. It bears noting that the Takings Clause does not
usually prohibit government action (as Justice O'Connor's approach implicitly presumes),
but merely conditions such action on the payment ofjust compensation.
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compensation at fair market value is the textual remedy for a proven
violation of the Takings Clause.
By way of contrast, the substantive aspect of the Due Process

Clauses requires a plaintiff to show, in the absence of a fundamental
right, that government action is fundamentally unfair-so much so
that it is either "arbitrary and irrational" or "shocks the
conscience.""

Merely negligent government conduct will almost

never violate the substantive aspect of the Due Process Clauses
(again, in the absence of a fundamental right). Many government
regulations that would easily survive substantive due process review

might not survive Takings Clause review without generating an
obligation to compensate affected property owners. Moreover, the
remedy for a violation of substantive due process is not
compensation, but judicial invalidation of the offending statute.
If the gravamen of a complaint is that government action is
unfair or unjust, rather than that the government has expropriated
property for its own use, the federal courts should require the plaintiff
to plead and prove the case under the less forgiving standards of
substantive due process.
This means that in most cases, the
government action will not generate an award of money damages.
Only in truly egregious cases will the government incur financial

obligations to adversely affected property owners. 133
Requiring proof of expropriatory intent would properly cabin the
scope of the Takings Clause to cases in which government is
132. Krotoszynski, supra note 15, at 583-90; see also Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S.
97, 102 (1877) ("It seems to us that a statute which declared in terms, and without more,
that the full and exclusive title of a described piece of land, which is now in A., shall be
and is vested in B., would, if effectual, deprive A. of his property interest without due
process of law, within the meaning of the constitutional provision."). See generally County
of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1998) (noting that "[s]ince the time of our
early explanations of due process, we have understood the core of the concept to be
protection against arbitrary action" and explaining that "[o]ur cases dealing with abusive
executive action have repeatedly emphasized that only the most egregious official conduct
[meets the standard]" and that "for half a century now we have spoken of the cognizable
level of executive abuse of power as that which shocks the conscience"); United States v.
Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 30-31 (1994) (analyzing retroactive tax legislation under "harsh and
oppressive" standard and noting that this standard prohibits "arbitrary and irrational"
laws).
133. This analysis assumes, of course, that the Supreme Court would not simply revive
a more aggressive form of substantive due process for claims involving property rights to
replace its current, highly expansive understanding of the Takings Clause. Cf Williamson
v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 487-89 (1955) (applying substantive due process
review in a highly deferential form, essentially permitting the state government to regulate
opticians without proffering any real reasons for the rules). Revival of Lochner under the
Due Process Clauses, rather than the Takings Clause, would not represent a significant
doctrinal improvement.
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effectively attempting to control property for its own purposes
without first paying for it.1M This approach would be consistent with
the original understanding of the Takings Clause 135 and would
provide a doctrinally persuasive rationale for the results in
Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon"6 and its jurisprudential

progeny.
III. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S CLOSE-BUT-NOT-QUITE TAKINGS
ANALYSIS
As will be developed more fully below, Justice Kennedy
appropriately analyzed Eastern Enterprises's claim under the
constitutional rubric of substantive due process. In doing so, he
offered several reasons for rejecting Eastern Enterprises's takings
claim. Although Justice Kennedy recognized the potential pitfalls
associated with the plurality's gloss on the Takings Clause, his
alternative approach would, like the plurality's approach, extend the
scope of the Takings Clause too far. On the other hand, Justice
Kennedy's test would be somewhat less susceptible to outright
judicial manipulation than the plurality's test and, on its face, would
not invite open-ended inquiries into the abstract justice or fairness of
economic or social legislation under the rubric of regulatory takings
doctrine.

134. As Chief Justice Rehnquist has explained, the Takings Clause does not prohibit
any particular subset of government actions, but rather conditions certain government
actions on the payment of just compensation:
This basic understanding of the Amendment makes clear that it is designed not
to limit governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to
secure compensation in the event of an otherwise proper interference amounting
to a taking. Thus, government action that works a taking of property rights
necessarily implicates the "constitutional obligation to pay just compensation."
FirstEnglish Evangelical Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 315 (quoting Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
135. See Hart, Land Use Law In the Early Republic, supra note 104, at 1107-47.
136. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). The argument would be that the Pennsylvania law at issue in
Mahon effectively seized ownership of mineral rights and then transferred those rights to
those using the surface of the land. The state government did not wish to purchase
mineral rights in order to protect subsistence, but simply legislated the property right in
underground minerals out of existence where exercising those rights would endanger
above-ground dwellings. The case is not really about a regulation that adversely affected a
property interest, but rather is about an attempt by Pennsylvania to seize all mineral rights
where the exercise of those rights might endanger existing surface developments. Because
Pennsylvania's law adversely affected property rights and because the state government
possessed expropriatory intent, the Supreme Court correctly decided the case. See infra
text and accompanying notes 153-62.
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A.

"Specificity" As the EssentialElement of a Takings Claim
Justice Kennedy intuitively realized that the Coal Act did not
constitute a taking: "Our cases do not support the plurality's
conclusion that the Coal Act takes property.' 1 37 For Justice Kennedy,
the fact that the Coal Act "imposes a staggering financial burden on
the petitioner, Eastern Enterprises," was not a sufficient condition to
trigger the Takings Clause, because the law did not "operate upon or
alter an identified property interest, and it [was] not applicable to or
measured by a property interest.' 1 38 He went on to note that the Coal
Act did not "encumber an estate in land ...,a valuable interest in an
account or accrued interest."' 39

intangible... , or even a bank
Because the Coal Act was "indifferent as to how the regulated entity
elects to comply or the property it uses to do so," it did not transgress
the Takings Clause. 40 Accordingly, to characterize the effect of such
a law as a "taking" was both "imprecise" and "unwise."''

For Justice Kennedy, the essence of a takings claim is the
identification of a specific res that the government seeks to seize or
control: "Until today, however, one constant limitation has been that
in all of the cases where the regulatory takings analysis has been
1 42
employed, a specific property right or interest has been at stake.'
In the case at bar, "[t]he Coal Act neither targets a specific property
interest nor depends upon any
particular property for the operation
' 43
of its statutory mechanisms.'
In Justice Kennedy's view, the Supreme Court should avoid an
open-ended approach to the Takings Clause because it would require
federal courts routinely to engage in "normative considerations about
the wisdom of government decisions."'"
As Justice Kennedy
properly notes, the Takings Clause does not limit the scope of
permissible government action; rather, it merely requires the
government to pay for the property interests that it takes. 45 If the
137. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 540 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part).
138. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
139. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
I& (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
Id. at 541 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
Id. at 543 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
Id. at 545 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) ("The Clause

operates as a conditional limitation, permitting the government to do what it wants so long

as it pays the charge."). Of course, if the Supreme Court attempted to enforce the "public
use" requirement of the Takings Clause in a meaningful way, a different result might
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question presented goes to the basic fairness or legitimacy of the
government's policy, rather than the question of compensation, a
reviewing court should employ the Due Process Clause rather than
the Takings Clause.
Justice Kennedy's policy arguments are quite sound and his
demarcation of the line between takings claims and substantive due
process claims makes a great deal of sense. When government acts in
a way that affects a particular property interest, and does so
intentionally, expropriatory intent may well be present. But the
specificity of the government's action vis-A-vis a property interest will
not invariably indicate a government action that is tantamount to an
expropriation. Moreover, as will be discussed in greater detail below,
a regulatory takings doctrine focused on the specificity of the
government's demand could be easily evaded.
Thus, Justice
Kennedy's definition of a taking does not entirely foreclose the
plurality's analysis of the Coal Act.
B.

The Shortcomings of Justice Kennedy's Approach

For Justice Kennedy, the question of whether the government
has committed a taking depends on the specificity of the property
interest affected; a generalized obligation that does not identify a
particular means of satisfaction does not constitute a taking because it
does not directly affect a specific property interest. Justice O'Connor
could counter this reasoning rather easily:
Money constitutes
property.14 6 The Takings Clause protects property, whether tangible
or intangible. In order to satisfy a financial obligation to the federal
government, one must have money (which, again, constitutes
property). Any law requiring the payment of a financial obligation
has the effect of requiring the surrender of money. Accordingly, any
law requiring the payment of money effects a taking as to the money
used to satisfy the obligation.
obtain. To date, however, the Court has not undertaken any such effort and, on the
contrary, has made clear that the public use requirement does not really limit the scope of
government action affecting property interests. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S.
229,239-43 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,31-34 (1954).
146. See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 163-72 (1998) (holding that
interest on lawyer trust accounts constitutes "property" for purposes of the Takings
Clause); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160-64 (1980)
(holding that interest on court-held funds constitutes property and cannot be used to
defray local court's operational expenses without compensation); Wash. Legal Found. v.
Tex. Equal Access to Justice Found., 270 F.3d 180, 185-95 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that
expropriation of interest on lawyer trust accounts constitutes a per se taking and declining
to apply Penn Centralanalysis).
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Arguably, Justice Kennedy's objection that the government does
not require any particular sum of money to satisfy an obligation
would be inconsequential from Justice O'Connor's perspective.
Whatever money one used to satisfy the obligation would be "taken"
by the government. The fact that the government did not specify the
precise federal reserve notes or bank accounts to be used would not
make the government's demand for money operate with any less
"specificity" vis-A-vis the money used to satisfy the obligation. In
other words, one could manipulate Justice Kennedy's concept of
"specificity" by simply deeming the property taken "specified" by the
government. This analysis would, of course, also hold true for
government demands associated with property other than money.
An example might help to clarify matters. Suppose that the
government required a farmer to deliver a dozen hens to the Internal
Revenue Service. In all probability, the government would be
indifferent as to which chickens the farmer selected to satisfy the
debt. Under Justice Kennedy's analysis, however, the specification of
chickens would trigger the Takings Clause. Suppose the IRS
demands cash rather than chickens. From an economic perspective,
the effect on the farmer is exactly the same. Thus, the "specificity"
requirement does not necessarily relate to or correlate with the
government's subjective intent vis- -vis a particular property interest.
Whether the government seizes property and sells it to satisfy a
debt or, alternatively, requires the taxpayer to satisfy the debt with
cash (perhaps forcing the taxpayer to liquidate property interests),
the economic effect of the transaction would be the same. It would
be silly to make the existence of a takings claim turn on whether the
IRS or the taxpayer actually sells the chickens. 147 In this sense, then,
Justice O'Connor has the better of the argument: an obligation to
pay money affects a property interest by completely defeasing the
person or corporation of its property interest in a particular sum of
money.
Notwithstanding its shortcomings, the specificity requirement
might well provide support for a finding of expropriatory intent. If
the government demands the surrender of Blackacre to satisfy an
outstanding tax obligation, rather than simply presenting the taxpayer
with a bill that the taxpayer must satisfy with assets of her own

147. But cf. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 83, at 315 ("At least a colorable
argument exists that when payment [of taxes] can only be made with particular property
rather than a common means of exchange, the government action is a taking and not a
tax.").
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choosing, it would not be unreasonable to infer an expropriatory
motive on the part of the government. If collection of revenue were
the government's real objective, the specification of Blackacre as the
means of satisfying a generalized need for revenue seems rather odd.
Coupled with additional facts-for example, Blackacre sits adjacent
to a national park and two years earlier the government sought to
purchase Blackacre but the owner refused to sell the property-a
demand for specific property might well reflect expropriatory intent.
The problem is that specificity is, at best, an imperfect proxy for
expropriatory intent. Justice Kennedy plainly believes that a taking
requires something more than a generalized interest in enforcing a
statutory obligation to pay money, refrain from polluting, or protect
the safety of workers laboring at an industrial facility. Thus, Justice
Kennedy recognized the shortcomings of the plurality's approach and
the importance of the government's intent in analyzing regulatory
takings claims. His proposed test falls short, however, because it falls
to capture the essence of a regulatory taking-expropriatory intent.
One can avoid the problem by focusing on the purpose of the
government regulation rather than whether the government action
affects a specific property interest. Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion, however, never quite frames the matter in these precise
terms.
The Takings Clause should supply a remedy only when
government holds a particular subjective intent vis-a-vis a property
interest. A taking occurs only when government wishes to
expropriate property for its use without providing just compensation.
A generalized obligation to satisfy a tax debt lacks any expropriatory
intent. Government has no specific interest in any particular
property, but rather a generalized interest in ensuring that the
taxpayer satisfies the financial obligation.
Returning to the Farmer Brown hypothetical, whether the IRS
seizes the chickens or effectively forces Farmer Brown to sell them,
no taking has occurred. Because the source of the government's
actions is regulatory in nature, the government lacks expropriatory
intent regardless of how it seeks to satisfy a tax debt.
The same would hold true of most Occupational Health and
Safety Administration ("OSHA")
and EPA regulations.
Government, acting as a regulator, creates an obligation to refrain
from creating certain workplace or environmental hazards, on pain of
a fine or forfeiture. Alternatively, government requires employers to
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remedy conditions that constitute unsafe working conditions 48 or to

reduce the amount of toxic emissions associated with an industrial

facility's operation. 149 In these circumstances, statutes or regulations
could operate directly on specific property interests. Under Justice
Kennedy's approach, all such regulations would be subject to attack
as regulatory takings because they potentially satisfy the "specificity"
requirement. 150 An approach requiring a showing of expropriatory
intent, however, would require would-be litigants to rely upon the less
welcoming doctrine of substantive due process.
In sum, the specificity of the government's demand should not
serve to ground a takings claim. Rather, the Supreme Court should
require takings plaintiffs to establish expropriatory, as opposed to
regulatory, intent on the part of the government. The model of a
takings claim should be the uncompensated exercise of eminent
domain powers.' If the sovereign seizes property, and occupies it for
its own use, expropriatory intent exists. As one moves from direct
seizure of land into the murky world of regulatory takings, the same
inquiry should be made and answered: can a reviewing court fairly
characterize the government's action as reflecting an analogous desire
to own, control, and exercise dominion over a particular interest in
property? 152 If on the facts at bar the court can answer this question
affirmatively, a taking has occurred, even if the government used
regulatory powers to achieve its objective.
IV. REORIENTING TAKINGS CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE TO
INCORPORATE THE "EXPROPRIATORY INTENT" APPROACH

Virtually all of the United States Supreme Court's cases finding a
regulatory taking would fit within the expropriatory intent analytic
framework. This section considers how, and in some cases whether,
148. See, e.g., Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 493-95 (1981);
Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 611-15 (1980). See
generally SIDNEY SHAPIRO & THOMAS McGARITY, WORKERS AT RISK: THE FAILED
PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY ADMINISTRATION (1994)

(describing comprehensively OSHA's process of regulating the health and safety of
workplaces).
149. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 83942, 845-51 (1984); see also Levine, supra note 102, at 39 (noting business leaders' concern
regarding the economic effects of EPA pollution standard).
150. Of course, Justice O'Connor's approach would treat virtually any law or
regulation as a taking, if it is sufficiently burdensome to the regulated entities and
sufficiently unexpected.
151. See Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic,supra note 104, at 1154-56.
152. See Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi, DisentanglingDeregulatory Takings, 86
VA. L. REv. 1435,1481-86 (2000).
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the expropriatory intent analysis would affect the outcomes in some
of the Supreme Court's major regulatory takings cases.
A.

Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon

Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon,53 the original source of
the Supreme Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence, would
probably be decided the same way under the expropriatory intent
approach. In Mahon, the Pennsylvania state legislature enacted a law
prohibiting the exploitation of mineral rights when such action would
threaten the subsistence necessary to support an existing structure on
the surface." On its face, the Kohler Act constituted a regulatory
enactment designed to protect the health, safety, and welfare of
Pennsylvania citizens residing in structures located atop anthracite
coal deposits; indeed, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania defended
the statute as a run-of-the-mill application of the state's traditional
police powers (a view that the Pennsylvania state courts embraced).
Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes opined that the
Supreme Court, pursuant to the Takings Clause, had a duty to make
an independent determination of the real-world effects of the Kohler
Act. Although "[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent
values incident to property could not be diminished without paying
for every such change in the general law," 155 limits exist to the state's
power to enact regulations affecting property values. "The general
rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. "156
Because this inquiry involves "a question of degree," a reviewing
court cannot dispose of it "by general propositions.1 57 In the case at
bar, Pennsylvania's legislature had gone too far in transferring value
from the holders of mineral rights to the holders of surface rights.
Mahon's test is a case study in vagueness. An inquiry into
whether a particular statute "goes too far" in affecting property rights
invites judges to pull out their individual moral compass.158 Justice

153. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
154. See id. at 412-13 (describing the effects of the Kohler Act, PA STAT. §§ 15330a-1
to 15330a-11 (West Cum.Supp. 1928)).
155. Id at 413.
156. Id. at 415.
157. Id. at 416.
158. Cf Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv.
L. REV.1, 12-20 (1959) (arguing that judges must engage in principled decision making in
order to maintain the institutional legitimacy of the federal courts).
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Holmes, however, could have rested the result in Mahon on a far less
ephemeral foundation.
Pennsylvania styled the Kohler Act as a police power regulation
and, at least superficially, that description was apt. On the other
hand, the Kohler Act had the effect of vesting those holding surface
rights with an absolute veto over the exercise of mineral rightsmineral rights for which the owner had paid fair market value. In this
fashion, the law effectively transferred property rights from the
owners of mineral rights to the owners of surface rights; the state
expropriated the mineral rights and gave control over them to the
holders of surface rights (at least under certain circumstances).
Although in the guise of regulation, the state's behavior really
constituted a kind of expropriation. Moreover, the expropriatory
nature of the Kohler Act was hardly accidental. The state legislature
intended to transfer control over the exercise of property rights from
one set of owners to another, without any consideration for those
surrendering their property rights.
On these facts, a reviewing court could reasonably find that the
state legislature possessed the requisite expropriatory intent to
support a takings claim. In economic terms, the Kohler Act was little
different in its effects than if the state had simply invoked its eminent
domain powers, seized certain mineral rights, and then redistributed
the mineral rights to those who inhabited buildings on the surface of
the land. Because the use of eminent domain would have triggered
an obligation to pay fair market value for the mineral rights taken,
the state decided to use the cellophane wrapper of a regulatory
statute to achieve its desired end.'5 9
Justice Brandeis's dissent takes the state's intended goal, public
safety, at face value: "But restriction imposed to protect the public
health, safety, or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking."'160
In his view, the Kohler Act was "merely the prohibition of a noxious
use."''
This approach ignores the fact that those building houses
while holding only surface rights assumed a rather considerable risk:
they bet that the owner of the mineral rights would elect not to
exercise them.
159. See United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 38 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "the Court cannot shut its eyes to what is obviously, because designedly, an
attempt to control conduct which the Constitution left to the responsibility of the States,
merely because Congress wrapped the legislation in the verbal cellophane of a revenue

measure").
160. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
161. Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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If a person constructing a home wished to ensure against such an
eventuality, she would have been entirely free to acquire both the
surface and mineral rights before building. Similarly, a person
wishing to buy an existing home would undoubtedly undertake a title
search prior to closing. A properly executed search would inevitably
reveal that the current owner lacked ownership of the mineral rights.
A prudent buyer would demand a discount in the price of the home
reflecting the risk of damage or inconvenience if the owner of the
mineral rights elected to exercise them.
Pennsylvania could have prohibited, ab initio, the division of
mineral rights from surface rights, within municipal boundaries. The
fact is that the state did not initially enact such a limitation on the
transfer of property rights and, later realizing the problems associated
with divorced ownership, attempted to fix the problem through a
naked wealth transfer. Having created a market for mineral rights,
the state could not effectively extinguish those rights by conditioning
their use on the permission of the owner of the surface rights. 62
B.

Nollan v. California Coastal Commission

Applying a theory of expropriatory intent would not affect the
outcome in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,163 another
major regulatory takings case, either. In Nollan, the owners of a
beachfront lot sought a permit to demolish a dilapidated beachfront
bungalow and erect a new house."6
The California Coastal
Commission, which possessed jurisdiction over the Nollans's permit
application, agreed to grant the permit on the condition that the
Nollans cede, in perpetuity, an easement across the property that
would connect two public beaches.' 65 Ostensibly, the easement was a
condition to compensate for the potential blockage of a roadside view
that existed prior to construction of the new house.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia characterized the
California Coastal Commission's quid pro quo demand as a
regulatory taking. "To say that the appropriation of a public
easement across a landowner's premises does not constitute the
162. Of course, in the absence of a pre-existing market, the state could have limited the
alienability of mineral rights as a matter of state property law. Such a regulation would
limit the use of real property, but would not reflect expropriatory intent on the part of the
state. In this way, then, the timing of the governmental action, as much as the nature of
the action, could play an important role in analyzing a regulatory takings claim.
163. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
164. Id. at 827-28.
165. IdMat 828.
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taking of a property interest but rather (as Justice Brennan contends)
'a mere restriction on its use,' is to use words in a manner that
1' 66
deprives them of all their ordinary meaning.'
He went on to invoke the Mahon test of a fundamentally fair
relationship between the state's interests and the economic effect on
the property owner. On the facts at bar, "the lack of nexus between
the condition and the original purpose of the building restriction
converts the purpose to something other than what it was."' 67 Justice
Scalia explained that "unless the permit condition serves the same
governmental purpose as the development ban, the building
restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but 'an out-and-out
plan of extortion.' "'6 California possessed the power of eminent
domain, pursuant to which it could extract the desired easement from
the Nollans' property; however, if it wished to do this, it would be
required to furnish the Noilans with "just compensation" for the lost
property rights. 69
The expropriatory intent theory is tailor-made for these facts.
Rather than conducting an inquiry into the reasonableness of the fit
between the conditional permit and the effect on the roadside view,
the reviewing court would inquire into the fundamental nature of the
Coastal Commission's actions:
Did the Commission possess
regulatory or expropriatory intent? Because the stated effect on the
roadside view had no discernable relationship to connecting two
public beaches via an extorted easement, a reasonable fact finder
would likely conclude that the Commission's claims of health, safety,
and welfare concerns were merely pretextual. Although in the guise
of the application of a comprehensive zoning scheme, the facts
suggest a desire to take property without paying fair market value.
As Justice Scalia suggests, an identical transaction would have been
to condemn the desired easement via eminent domain (thereby
incurring an obligation to compensate the Nollans).
Had the Commission imposed limitations on height, color, or
other aesthetic conditions related to both the adequacy and aesthetics
of the view from the road, a reasonable trier of fact would have been

166. Id. at 831 (citation omitted).
167. Id. at 837.
168. Id (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12,14-15 (N.H. 1981)).
169. See id at 841-42 ("California is free to advance its 'comprehensive program,' if it
wishes, by using the power of eminent domain for this 'public purpose'; but if it wants an
easement across the Nollans' property, it must pay for it." (citation omitted)).
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harder pressed to infer expropriatory intent. 70 That said, the lack of
fit between policy goals and conditions on development, per se,
should not be the focus of the reviewing court's inquiry. Rather, the
inquiry should focus on the probable motivation of the governmental
entity. Where government attempts to effect an uncompensated
transfer of property rights for a public purpose, federal courts should
find a violation of the Takings Clause.
C. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council"' presents a somewhat
harder case than Nollan. Under an expropriatory intent approach,
the result in Lucas would probably be different than under the
Supreme Court's approach.
Lucas involved the South Carolina Coastal Council's creation
and enforcement of a beachfront erosion control plan that severely
limited development on lots located seaward of the line of predicted
erosion. Concerned about the potential for erosion on the Isle of
Palms, a delicate barrier island, the council adopted a plan that
prohibited Mr. Lucas from developing two beachfront lots because
they were located within the plan's buffer zone.
The council's enforcement of its rules effectively precluded the
issuance of building permits for houses to be located on two very
expensive beachfront lots on the Isle of Palms.172 That said, the
council did not require Lucas to condition the development of his lot
on some neighboring landowner's consent 73 or to convey an interest
in the land to the government. 7 4 Instead, because of safety and
environmental concerns, the agency simply refused to allow any

170. See generally Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 505-12, 521
n.25 (1981) (plurality opinion) (invalidating local ordinance because overbroad but noting
that First Amendment would permit a city policy banning outdoor commercial advertising
displays, including billboards, in order to promote aesthetic values); City Council of L.A.
v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805-07 (1984) (noting that Metromedia upheld
"city's interest in avoiding visual clutter" against a First Amendment challenge and stating
that "[w]e reaffirm the conclusion of the majority in Metromedia").
171. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
172. Id. at 1006-07.
173. Cf Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-16 (1922) (rejecting on Takings
Clause grounds a Pennsylvania law that conditioned the exercise of mineral rights to mine
coal on the consent of the surface owner who might be adversely affected by extraction of
the underground coal deposits).
174. Cf Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827-31 (rejecting on Takings Clause grounds conditional
approval of building permit where the government required a property owner to grant an
easement across land to connect two public beaches, thereby turning portion of the
property into a de facto public beach).
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development on the lots in question (or any other similarly situated
lots that had not yet been developed).
On these facts, the council lacked any expropriatory intent: it
did not seek to convert Mr. Lucas's land to public use, or otherwise
require him to cede control of it to some third party. Rather, because
of the threat of erosion and the need to protect a sensitive ecosystem,
the agency required Lucas to refrain from developing his land. To be
sure, the effect of the agency's decision had a profound impact on the
value of Lucas's property. Obviously, a beachfront parcel with a
house has a much higher market value than a beachfront parcel that
the owner cannot develop with a permanent structure. This logic,
however, proves too much. Virtually any scheme of zoning
diminishes the ability of property owners to put their land to its most
economically valuable potential use. A cement plant might be quite
profitable if located in the middle of a suburban residential housing
development, but the owners of such real property are not usually
free to put the land to industrial use.
Mr. Lucas certainly suffered a serious change in his expectations
regarding the possible use of the parcel. The Takings Clause cannot,
however, be used to protect his reliance interests without defeasing
government of the ability to establish basic public policies. Consider,
for example, a jurisdiction that permits land-based casino gambling
operations. Many developers, placing reliance on the local law
permitting casino gambling, might allocate capital resources to the
construction and operation of luxury hotel/casino resorts. The
amortization schedules for these developments might run for a
decade or more (for example, the investments can be profitable only
if operated for a period of years).
Now suppose, incident to an election, an anti-gambling
legislature and governor take control of the state house. Upon taking
office, the legislators and governor repeal the laws permitting landbased casinos and impose stiff criminal penalties for any and all
violations of the new anti-gambling laws. The developers of the new
casino hotels have just suffered a tremendous financial setback; they
probably cannot recover their stranded capital in the new antigambling climate. If Justice Scalia's logic in Lucas is correct, because
the value of the casinos as casinos is now zero, the state would incur
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an obligation to buy out the developers before repealing its
permissive gambling laws. 75
This approach to the Takings Clause effectively denies
government the ability to set basic health, safety, and welfare policies
when doing so severely affects capital investments. As a matter of
constitutional governance, neither the states nor the federal
government should be precluded from changing course without
compensating those adversely affected for upset economic
expectations. 176 As the Lochner-era Supreme Court once observed,
"[p]arties cannot remove their transactions from the reach177 of
dominant constitutional power by making contracts about them.'
The South Carolina Beachfront Management Act was, in
principle, no different from the hypothetical repeal of the gambling
laws. The state permitted virtually unchecked growth on the barrier
islands until it realized that the ecological and financial costs of such
growth could not (or should not) be borne by the citizens of the
Palmetto State. 78 Mr. Lucas might not have foreseen this basic
change in public policy, but this should not entitl- him to a
government buy out of his stranded capital investment. The South
Carolina law reflected regulatory, and not expropriatory, intent.179 Its
effects, although perhaps unexpected, unfair, and costly to Mr. Lucas,
do not constitute a "taking" of the affected properties. 80
Of course, Mr. Lucas could claim that, as a matter of substantive
due process, the Beachfront Management Act has a secondary
retroactivity that is fundamentally unfair. Similarly, the owners of the
casino resorts in the hypothetical might challenge the gambling repeal
legislation on substantive due process grounds. Of course, neither
Mr. Lucas nor the hypothetical casino owners would be likely to

175. But see Westside Quik Shop, Inc. v. Stewart, 534 S.E.2d 270, 274-75 (S.C. 2000)
(rejecting regulatory takings claim premised on change of legal status of video poker

machines from lawful to unlawful).
176. See Rose-Ackerman & Rossi, supranote 152, at 1481-86, 1493-95.
177. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240,308 (1935).
178. Development in areas prone to erosion would certainly adversely affect the
insurance rates in the jurisdiction. Conversely, prohibiting development in such areas
should decrease the risk of claims, and thereby facilitate more reasonable premiums.
179. The government limited land use in certain coastal zones to reduce the risk of
erosion and, where erosion would be inevitable, to minimize the financial and
environmental losses and risks to human safety.
180. To be clear, I am not suggesting or arguing that only public use of a property
interest would indicate or support an inference of expropriatory intent. For example,
Mahon involved a transfer of property rights between private parties, rather than a public
occupation or dedication of private property to the general public.
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prevail on such a claim

81a

The point still remains: courts should use

substantive due process, rather than the Takings Clause, to review
claims that new public policies are fundamentally unfair or

arbitrary.'2
D. Dolan v. City of Tigard
Dolan v. City of Tigard'83 presents a middle case; the facts are

more suggestive of expropriatory intent than Lucas, but less
suggestive of such intent than either Mahon or Nollan. In Dolan,
Florence Dolan, the owner of a plumbing and electric supply store,
wished to expand the size of her store and increase the number of

parking spaces available for her customers."s She also planned to
develop a second building and create still more parking spaces.185 In
order to make these improvements, Dolan needed the city's approval.

The City Planning Commission approved Ms. Dolan's proposed
improvements to her lot, but conditioned its approval on Dolan
granting the city a permanent easement across her land for a
greenway.'8 6

The greenway would feature a pedestrian/bicycle

pathway open to the public.' 7 In addition, the Commission required
Dolan to refrain from developing a portion of her land to permit

181. See Westside Quik Shop, Inc. v. Stewart, 534 S.E.2d 270,274-75 (S.C. 2000).
182. The Supreme Court's most recent regulatory takings case, Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448 (2001), addresses the question of precisely who may litigate a
takings claim. The would-be plaintiff, Anthony Palazzolo, took title to real property
incident to the dissolution of a corporation, Shore Gardens, Inc. During the period Shore
Gardens held title to the land, Rhode Island adopted legislation that protected wetlands
from development. Id. at 2455-56. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that because
Palazzolo took title after the effective date of the land use restrictions, he could not raise a
takings claim. Id. at 2456-57. For purposes of applying the expropriatory intent approach
to regulatory takings claims propounded in this Article, the case presents facts virtually
identical to those in Lucas; Rhode Island adopted an environmental protection statute
that, as implemented, effectively banned development on salt marshes. See id. at 2454-56.
In order to avoid environmental damage, the Rhode Island Coastal Resources
Management Council refused to grant either Shore Gardens or Mr. Palazzolo permission
to develop the wetlands portion of the parcel. As in Lucas, and on its face, the state does
not appear to possess expropriatory intent. That said, the Supreme Court's disposition of
the case focused primarily on the question of whether the transfer of title precluded
Palazzolo from prosecuting a takings claim. See id. at 2462-64. The majority concluded
that the transfer of title, standing alone, did not preclude Mr. Palazzolo from bringing a
takings claim premised on the continuing effects of the environmental legislation. Id.
183. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
184. See id. at 379.
185. Id
186. Id at 379-80.
187. See id at 397-80.
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improvements to a storm drainage system associated with Fanno
Creek, a stream running across her parcel."' 8
Ms. Dolan objected to the conditions. 89 The Commission
responded by saying the conditions were directly linked to the
increased traffic and drainage problems that the proposed
improvements to Dolan's parcel would cause. 19° Additional paving
would increase the runoff into the Fanno Creek, thereby increasing
the risk of localized flooding; the increased vehicular traffic going to
and from the businesses on Ms. Dolan's parcel would contribute to
noise, traffic, and pollution problems in the City of Tigard. 9 '
Ms. Dolan sued in state court, alleging that the Commission's
conditions did not reasonably relate to legitimate state interests, and
therefore transgressed the Takings Clause. '9 The Oregon state
courts uniformly rejected Dolan's claim, finding that an "essential
nexus" existed between the conditions and the potential effects of
Dolan's proposed improvements to her land. 93 The United States
Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the Oregon
Supreme Court's decision sustaining the Commission's conditional
approval of Ms. Dolan's permit applications.194
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that
"[w]ithout question, had the city simply required the petitioner to
dedicate a strip of land along Fanno Creek for public use, rather than
conditioning the grant of her permit to redevelop her property on
such a dedication, a taking would have occurred."' 95 The City of
Tigard did not, however, directly seize Dolan's property. In these
circumstances, a taking occurs if the government's actions fail to
"substantially advance legitimate state interests" or if the government
"denies an owner economically viable use of his land."' 96 Chief
Justice Rehnquist further observed that an additional requirement
applies in cases involving conditional approvals of land use: an
"essential nexus" must exist between the government's conditions
and the legitimate state interest. 97

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
See id. at 380-81.
Id. at 381-82.
Id
See id. at 382-83.
See id.
Id. at 374.
Id. at 384.
Id. at 385 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,260 (1980)).
See id. at 386-87.
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In the case at bar, Chief Justice Rehnquist readily agreed with
the City of Tigard that increased traffic and flooding problems could
result from Dolan's improvements. 195 Accordingly, a nexus existed
between the Commission's conditions and the city's objectives set
forth in the master zoning plan. 9 For the majority, however, this
determination did not end the inquiry. Rather, having established a
nexus, the majority required that the "essential nexus" also meet a
proportionality test-the Commission's conditions could not be
overbroad relative to the incremental increase in traffic or flooding
associated with the improvements.2°
Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that "[w]e think a term such as
'rough proportionality' best encapsulates what we hold to be the
requirement of the Fifth Amendment."2 "1 Although "[n]o precise
mathematical calculation is required," the government must "make
some sort of individualized determination that the required
dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the
proposed development." 2" Applying this test, he found that the City
of Tigard had failed to relate the scope of the dedications to the
increased traffic and flooding problems directly associated with Ms.
Dolan's redevelopment plan.203
Justice Stevens authored the principal dissent, arguing that the
City of Tigard's zoning plan was a routine health, safety, and welfare
regulation that deserved a high degree of judicial deference °4 In his
view, "[i]f the government can demonstrate that the conditions it has
imposed in a land use permit are rational, impartial and conducive to
fulfilling the aims of a valid land use plan, a strong presumption of
validity should attach to those conditions."205 Moreover, the burden
of demonstrating the irrationality of the local government's
conditions "belongs squarely on the shoulders
of the party
20 6
challenging the state action's constitutionality.
198. Id at 387.
199. See id. at 387-88.
200. See id. at 388-96; see also Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 702-03
(1999) (stating that the "rough-proportionality" test elaborated in Dolan applies only to
"the special context of exactions" and has not been extended to outright denials of
proposed development plans requiring zoning waivers or permits).
201. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
202. Id.
203. See id at 394-95.
204. See id. at 396-97, 405, 409-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
205. I& at 411 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
206. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also took issue with whether a
conditional approval of a discretionary waiver constituted a taking in any event. Because
the City of Tigard had enacted an otherwise valid comprehensive land use plan and
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Applying an expropriatory intent analysis, Dolan falls
somewhere between Nollan and Lucas. The City of Tigard did not
directly act on Ms. Dolan's property interests; rather, it responded to
a request for discretionary action by conditioning approval upon the
surrender of valuable property rights. If one focuses on the city's
interest in maintaining the integrity of its comprehensive zoning plan,
it seems to have possessed purely regulatory intent. Tigard's City
Planning Commission merely enforced an otherwise valid set of
restrictions when analyzing Ms. Dolan's proposed redevelopment
plan for her land. Conversely, if one focuses upon the nature of the
conditions Tigard imposed, it looks like a direct exaction of Dolan's
property fights as a quid pro quo for obtaining permission to expand
her business operations.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's focus on the degree of relationship
between the conditions and the underlying objectives of the master
zoning plan would be highly relevant in analyzing the city's probable
intent. If flooding were the sole concern, permitting public access to
Ms. Dolan's land would not have any relationship to meeting this
goal. Moreover, a simple promise not to develop the floodplain
portion of the parcel, rather than a transfer of title to the city, would
have been more than sufficient to meet this concern. The forced
creation of a public park on the floodplain easement, however, would
tend to support an inference of expropriatory intent-the City of
Tigard wanted to establish a municipal park on Dolan's land, but did
not wish to pay for the land prior to putting it to such a use.
If the city's real concern was increased traffic due to the
expanded business, a flat denial would have made more sense than
requiring a footpath/bike trail across Ms. Dolan's land. How many
people buying plumbing supplies or electrical supplies will walk or
use a bicycle for transport? It seems doubtful that a person
purchasing a bathtub or toilet will simply strap the purchase onto her
handy Schwinn ten-speed. If Ms. Dolan operated a restaurant or
cyber cafe, it might be plausible to believe that the city's requirement
of foot and pedal power access to the business reflected a genuine
concern for traffic rather than a desire to open a new park. Although
Dolan's proposal violated it, the City of Tigard was completely within its rights to deny
flatly Dolan's application for a waiver. See id. at 407-10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Nor
would Stevens treat conditional approvals of zoning variances as "unconstitutional
conditions." In his view, the increased value of the improved parcel would have to be
measured against the value lost due to the city's conditions. If the benefits were more
valuable than the costs, no taking, direct or indirect, would have occurred. See id at 40709 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the matter is not entirely free from doubt, Ms. Dolan's lawyers could
make a strong case for finding that the City of Tigard possessed
expropriatory, rather than regulatory, intent when establishing the
conditions on the required variances and permits.
The focus of the analysis, however, should be on discerning the
city's actual motive for establishing the conditions on the waivers and
permits, rather than the fairness of the conditions in the abstract.
Some communities, like Hilton Head Island, South Carolina, and
Seaside, Florida, maintain highly restrictive zoning laws designed to
promote a particular aesthetic vision. Waivers of these plans, if
granted at all, might be highly conditioned on things like extensive
landscaping, greenbelts to hide unsightly buildings, or other
potentially costly mitigation techniques. Even if these conditions
severely burden the ability of a landowner to develop her property,
the federal courts should not deem them to be "takings" based on an
independent examination of the "rough proportionality" between the
effects of the conditions and the goals of the master zoning plan. A
community dedicated to preserving an aesthetic ideal should be
permitted to raise the transaction costs of commercial development
without incurring liabilities under the Takings Clause.
The City of Tigard's behavior departed from this model in a
number of important ways. Although one could justify the easement
as a flood control measure, transferring title to the city and requiring
public access did not advance the city's stated goal in avoiding
flooding problems. Although on different facts, access to Dolan's
business via foot or bicycle might have been plausible as a traffic
mitigation measure, the nature of Dolan's store severely undercuts
the logic of this argument. In the totality of the circumstances, the
City of Tigard basically extorted parklands as a condition of
approving Dolan's redevelopment plan. If one were to model an
identical transaction, the exercise of eminent domain over the land
adjoining the Fanno Creek and the creation of a public
park/greenway would have achieved an identical result.
Had the City of Tigard simply limited the square footage of the
new buildings (so as to limit the potential traffic associated with
them) and mandated a floodplain easement to mitigate runoff
problems associated with more paved surfaces along the Fanno Creek
drainage area, the city could have made a much more persuasive case
that it lacked expropriatory intent. To be sure, the conclusion that
the city possessed expropriatory intent rests on an inference drawn
from the facts. Such an inference is, however, entirely plausible in the
totality of the circumstances.
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The principal focus of a reviewing court's inquiry provides the
key difference between Chief Justice Rehnquist's approach and the
approach proposed in this Article. Chief Justice Rehnquist engaged
in an open-ended analysis of the fundamental fairness of the City of
Tigard's conditions-provoking Justice Stevens to accuse the majority
of resurrecting Lochner via the Takings Clause. 07 The wisdom, or
fundamental fairness, of a local government's decision would not
serve as the focus of an inquiry into expropriatory intent. Local
governments would be free to pass truly stupid laws, in the sense of
maximizing wealth or utility-laws that significantly and irrationally
reduce the value of real property within the jurisdiction.0 8
E.

ExpropriatoryIntent, the Takings Clause,and the ProperRole of
Substantive Due Process

An open-ended inquiry into the "legitimacy" of local land use
decisions, coupled with an "essential nexus" and "rough
proportionality" requirement for conditional waivers of courtapproved policies, simply invites federal judges to serve as the
ultimate local zoning board. 0 9 Moreover, such judicial efforts surely
will chill local governments from properly exercising their
responsibility to regulate land use for the good of the entire
community. Focusing the judicial review process on whether a
governmental entity acted with expropriatory intent would
significantly cabin the ability of federal judges to second-guess local
land use policies. Moreover, such an approach would make it
virtually impossible to deploy the Takings Clause to attack
environmental and workplace regulations designed to promote
health, safety, and welfare.

207. Justice Stevens objected that:
The so-called 'regulatory takings' doctrine that the Holmes dictum kindled has
an obvious kinship with the line of substantive due process cases that Lochner
exemplified. Besides having similar ancestry, both doctrines are potentially
open-ended sources of judicial power to invalidate state economic regulations
that Members of this Court view as unwise or unfair.
See id at 406-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208. For example, imagine a law requiring that all residential construction undertaken
after a certain date feature thatched roofs. Similarly, an eco-friendly community in
California might ban central air conditioning systems in new homes to conserve electricity
or to avoid noise pollution. In either case, the restrictions would undoubtedly depress
property values, for reasons that most observers would find dubious.
209. Cf. Rose-Ackerman & Rossi, supra note 152, at 1493 ("When the government is
best characterized as a policymaker, compensation should not be the general rule.").
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The OSH Act,210 the Endangered Species Act 21 ' the Clean Air

Act,212

and many other similar enactments could all trigger staggering
financial liabilities if the federal courts permit takings claims based on
a showing of "severe retroactive liability" that upsets "reasonable,
investment-backed expectations."
Rather than permitting duly
elected legislative bodies to establish basic economic, social, and
environmental policies, those with sufficient capital could, via careful
investment, estop government from making more than superficial
changes in the community's social order. For example, by investing in
certain property, and perhaps making improvements, a property
owner could effectively foreclose the government from changing any
legal rule if the change would significantly and adversely affect the

property's value.
In the context of the Contracts Clause, 213 the Supreme Court
wisely has rejected the idea that capital investment precludes the
subsequent exercise of the police powers to change basic social
policies. 214 The Justices should abandon the Lochner-esque approach
to the Takings Clause reflected in cases like Eastern Enterprises and
Lucas. Instead, they should require plaintiffs in takings cases to
establish that the government's action is tantamount to a direct

expropriation of the property interest at issue. Should the plaintiffs
fail to meet the burden of establishing expropriatory intent, they

should obtain neither financial compensation nor injunctive relief
(unless they can show a substantive due process violation).2 5
In this sense, then, requiring a showing of expropriatory intent as
a necessary element of a takings claim would bring needed doctrinal
210. See The Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970,29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994
& Supp. V 1999).
211. See The Endangered Species Act of 1973,16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1554 (2000).
212. See The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671q (West 1995 & Supp. 2001).
213. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No state shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post
facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.").
214. See Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434-43 (1934); see
also Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 189-94 (1983) (rejecting Contracts Clause
objection to provision in Alabama excise tax statute prohibiting suppliers from passing the
cost of the tax increase on to consumers); Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power &
Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 410-19 (1983) (rejecting Contracts Clause claim based on effects
of state law selecting price methodology for natural gas even though law had the effect of
reducing price term in pre-existing contracts). But cf Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 240-51 (1978) (holding invalid, on Contract Clause basis, a
Minnesota law that imposed a retroactive pension funding obligation on certain
employers).
215. See Rose-Ackerman & Rossi, supra note 152, at 1481-86 (arguing that
government should not be liable to pay compensation when it acts as policymaker, even if
changes in policy have adverse financial consequences for regulated entities).
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order to an otherwise muddled field of constitutional law. Of course,
2 16
the Supreme Court's case law on physical occupation of property
and temporally limited takings217 could easily co-exist with a
substantially revised doctrine of regulatory takings premised on a
showing of expropriatory intent. Regulatory takings cases based on
ad hoc determinations of fundamental fairness or evaluations of
whether a particular regulation "goes too far" would not 18 Perhaps
most importantly, an approach to regulatory takings premised on
expropriatory intent would avoid the undesirable resurrection of
Lochner-esque judicial review of basic economic and social
legislation-a result left quite open by Justice O'Connor's plurality
opinion in Eastern Enterprises.
V. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO REQUIRING
EXPROPRIATORY INTENT AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF A
TAKINGS CLAUSE CLAIM

Requiring a showing of expropriatory intent would not
necessarily make the adjudication of takings claims substantially
easier. After all, precisely what does it mean to say that the
government acted with "expropriatory intent"? At least arguably,
modifying Takings Clause jurisprudence to require a showing of
expropriatory intent would simply shift the battle from one
shibboleth to another. Exchanging one set of casuistic exercises for
another would not improve the clarity or effectiveness of Takings
Clause jurisprudence, nor would it more effectively cabin the limits of
judicial discretion.2 19
216. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427-32, 435
(1982).
217. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304,317-20 (1987).
218. See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522-24 (1998) (plurality opinion); Pa.
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413-15 (1922).
219. See generally Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 866-67,
874-79 (1960) (describing his unqualified commitment to enforcing the text of the
Constitution as written and suggesting that "balancing" approaches to the task of
interpreting constitutional text undermine its provisions and invite federal judges to
arrogate legislative powers to themselves); Harry Kalven, Jr., Upon Rereading Mr. Justice
Black on the First Amendment, 14 UCLA L. REv. 428, 447-53 (1967) (describing and
critiquing Justice Black's "literalist" approach to constitutional adjudication in the specific
context of the Free Speech Clause); Charles A. Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living
Constitution,76 HARv. L. REv. 673, 690-94, 717-23, 733-50 (1963) (expressing fears that
rules embracing judicial discretion, such as substantive due process, will inevitably devolve
over time into forms of naked judicial activism). But cf. Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951) ("There are no talismanic words that can avoid the
process of judgment.").
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A critic might argue that, under the proposed theory, judges
intent on finding a taking would declare "expropriatory intent" to
exist, whereas judges equally bent on denying the existence of a
takings claim would simply report that the government lacked the

requisite intent. It is certainly true that a judge could deploy the test
in support of a results-oriented jurisprudence. This objection,
however, proves too much.

Many tests in constitutional law presuppose good faith
application by judges1 0 The Supreme Court's free speech and equal
protection precedents are rife with three-part tests that require

subjective application of factors capable of manipulation (for
example, the constitutionality of a federal or state law depending on a

showing of a "substantial relationship to a significant government
interest"),P Among these factors, of course, is intent. For example,
in Washington v. Davis,. the Supreme Court held that proof of
discriminatory intent constitutes an essential element of an equal

protection claim.m
In order to establish an Equal Protection Clause violation, a
plaintiff must prove that the government harbored discriminatory
intent. 4 When a law facially discriminates on an invidious basis,
showing discriminatory intent presents little difficulty.2?5 Conversely,
when a facially neutral law has a disparate impact on a vector
triggering strict scrutiny (for example, race), the plaintiff cannot
prevail unless she establishes that this impact is something more than

220. But cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 108-11 (2000) (applying the Equal Protection
Clause in a strong fashion, requiring a state to count ballots under a rational standard,
even absent any showing of discriminatory intent or purposeful discrimination, and
featuring a majority composed of Justices not well-known for broadly interpreting the
Equal Protection Clause in cases presenting similar facts); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., An
Epitaphiosfor Neutral Principlesin ConstitutionalLaw: Bush v. Gore and the Emerging
Jurisprudenceof Oprahl, 90 GEO. LJ. __
(forthcoming 2002) (arguing that majority
opinion was unprincipled and reflects devolution of stare decisis in favor of judging
process predicated on drafting opinions that reach preferred outcomes).
221. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,723-26 (1982).
222. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
223. See id. at 239-45.
224. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65
(1977); see also Michelle Adams, Causation and Responsibility in Tort, 79 TEx. L. REv.
643, 644-52, 684-701 (2001) (discussing the related, but distinct, requirement that a
governmental entity prove intentional past discrimination that causes continuing
contemporary effects as a predicate for any current affirmative action efforts using race or
gender classifications).
225. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,531-34 (1996); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).
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merely coincidental.226 A plaintiff may establish discriminatory intent
through an inference arising from statistical disparities, but a
statistical disparity, standing alone, does not establish the requisite
discriminatory intent.227
Plainly, the requirement of showing discriminatory intent
requires judges to engage in a bit of guesswork regarding the actual
motives of a governmental body.'
To some extent, of course, a
reviewing court might well find it quite impossible to discern with
certainty the actual motive of a majority of those legislators
supporting or opposing a particular piece of legislation 229
Nevertheless, federal courts undertake the effort, and the Supreme
Court has never suggested that the federal courts are institutionally
incapable of enforcing fairly the requirement of establishing
discriminatory intent.
Returning to the context of the Takings Clause, a requirement of
showing expropriatory intent should not prove any more difficuit in
application than the analogous requirement of establishing
discriminatory intent in certain types of equal protection cases. That
the test might be susceptible to manipulation in the hands of resultsoriented jurists does not demonstrate the inefficacy of the test across

226. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-99 (1987); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356,368-74 (1886).
227. Compare Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-80 (1979) (rejecting
gender-based equal protection claim because plaintiff failed to establish discriminatory
intent notwithstanding disparate impact of hiring preference for veterans), and Vill of
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264-71 (rejecting race-based equal protection claim because
plaintiffs failed to establish discriminatory intent notwithstanding discriminatory effect of
zoning decision), with Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227-31 (1985) (finding a
facially neutral provision of the Alabama constitution to violate the Equal Protection
Clause because framers of provision harbored discriminatory intent when including it),
and Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 492-500 (1977) (permitting use of statistical
disparities in racial composition of petit and grand juries to support inference of
discriminatory intent on part of local court officials).
228. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,54042 (1993) (analyzing political events surrounding adoption of city ban on "ritual slaughter"
and finding that city ordinance reflected intentional animus toward practitioners of
Santerian religion). But cf Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of OriginalIntent in Statutory
Construction, 11 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 59, 65-66 (1988) (questioning whether
legislative intent even exists and suggesting that legislative decision making should be
viewed merely as a related series of bargains); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and
Structure in Statutory Interpretation,17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 68-70 (1994) (same).
229. Cf. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 228-33 (examining the history of Alabama constitutional
conventions and concluding that, based on statements by some participants and overall
attitude of delegates, state constitutional provision denying convicted felons the right to
vote reflected both discriminatory purpose and effect and, therefore, was invalid on equal
protection grounds).
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the broad generality of cases.210 Furthermore, as with discriminatory
intent in equal protection cases, judges could infer expropriatory
In consequence, the
intent from circumstantial evidence.231
requirement of establishing expropriatory intent would not be solely
an exercise in judicial caprice.
Over time, precedents would develop that delimit how and when
government acts with expropriatory intent. As these cases begin to
accrue, judges wishing to depart from earlier precedents arbitrarily
will find undertaking such a task increasingly difficult012 Because the
essence of the art of judging is giving reasons in support of results, 3
the de facto discretion of judges to apply the expropriatory intent
requirement in an arbitrary fashion would recede over time as the
precedents defining and applying the standard became more
numerous. In the end, as Justice Frankfurter once explained, "The
ultimate reliance for the fair operation of any standard is a judiciary
of high competence and character and the constant play of an
informed professional critique upon its work."'

230. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,489 (1951) ("Some scope for
judicial discretion in applying the formula can be avoided only by falsifying the actual
process ofjudging or by using the formula as an instrument of futile casuistry. It cannot be
too often repeated that judges are not automata.").
231. Factors that might support drawing such an inference include the effect of the
regulation on particular property owners, the number of property owners affected by the
regulation, and the degree to which the property owners may still put their property to its
regular or intended use. Thus, a law or regulation that effectively precludes any
economically beneficial use of property, and that affects only a handful of property
owners, might reflect expropriatory intent on the part of the government, depending on
the other facts and circumstances. In cases like Nollan or Dolan, the case for finding
expropriatory intent would be quite strong (if not compelling). Conversely, in cases like
Eastern Enterprises, the plaintiffs would have a more difficult time establishing this
element from the circumstances.
232. E. Gary Spitko, A Biologic Argument for Gay Essentialism-Determinism:
Implicationsfor Equal Protectionand Substantive Due Process, 18 U. HAW. L. REV. 571,
595-96 (1996) ("Having set forth in the last sixty years an ample body of case law giving
meaning to 'liberty' wvithin the privacy sphere of the Due Process Clause, the Supreme
Court is better able to distill directly from those cases the principles that speak to the
definition of liberty.").
233. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 648-59 (1995); see
also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of
ConstitutionalMeta-Analysis in State Action Determinations,94 MICH. L. REV. 302, 33334 (1995) (describing the overly formalistic nature of court's state action determinations as
an avoidance of reasoned judicial discretion).
234. Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 489; see Deborah Jones Merritt & James J.
Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publicationin the United States Courts of
Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71, 121 (2001) ("Applying law, like shaping it, requires
judgment; judgment implies discretion.").
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A second potential objection inheres in the potentially limitless
scope of the concept of "expropriation." At its most general level,
"expropriation" occurs any time a government makes a demand of its
citizens. Whether government demands time or money, every legal
command expropriates, or "takes," either labor or the monetized
value of labor. In this way, every government action carries with it a
kind of "expropriatory intent." 5 Obviously, this Article does not
intend to connote such a meaning for purposes of developing a theory
of the Takings Clause premised on expropriatory intent. This Article
argues that "expropriatory intent" exists only when a government
acts to possess property via conduct that, at the time the Framers
drafted and ratified the Bill of Rights, would constitute a taking.
Thus, an uncompensated exercise of the state's eminent domain
powers would present a classic case of a government acting with
expropriatory intent, whereas the enactment of general health, safety,
or welfare laws incidentally affecting property uses or values would
not.z 6 In addition, government actions that, although cloaked in
regulatory form, are tantamount to an uncompensated eminent
domain action would also reflect expropriatory intent. General
health, safety, and welfare laws that could not be modeled as
uncompensated eminent domain actions would not satisfy either
definition.
In this sense, expropriatory intent does not exist in every case
where the government demands labor or wealth. If one were to
construe the term to encompass any government action commanding
the surrender of labor or wealth, every government action would
constitute a taking. Although effectively squelching the possibility of
government exercising its duly delegated powers might appeal to
radical libertarians and anti-government World Trade Organization
("WTO") protestors, it does not represent a plausible theory of the
Takings Clause. Indeed, even the broadest of the Supreme Court's
takings pronouncements implicitly rejects the idea that every
obligation to surrender labor or money to the government constitutes
an uncompensated taking.
235. See generally FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944) (arguing
that government's principal legitimate role is to secure and protect stable property rights
and that government should strictly limit activities that involve the involuntary acquisition
of citizens' property or wealth); JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §§ 2551, at 303-320 (P. Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1690) (explaining the labor
theory of property and the government's ability to both secure stable property rights and
exact property rights from citizens incident to the social contract).
236. See Hart, Colonial Land Use Law, supra note 104, at 1287-97; Hart, Land Use
Law in the Early Republic,supra note 104, at 1147-56.
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769

All scholarly and judicial commentators agree that some
government actions should constitute takings, whereas others should

not? 7 Accordingly, the question in each instance is whether the
government's demands should be cognizable as a "taking" because
they are somehow too onerous or arbitrary, or force a
disproportionate economic burden upon a single property owner.
Given the clear historical mandate for a limited vision of the Takings
Clause, and the ready availability of the doctrine of substantive due
process to thwart truly outrageous government conduct,218 the
Supreme Court should give the Takings Clause a limited reading-a
reading supported by both its text and historical roots?239
The Supreme Court remains free, of course, to disregard history
in favor of a textualist, but not originalist, parsing of the text. Indeed,
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Eastern Enterprises incorporates and
reflects just such an approach 40 Once one abandons the historical
237. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 4, at 19-31; WILLIAM A. FISCHEL,
REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (1995); LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 9-6, at 605-07 (2d ed. 1988); Robert H.
Bork, The Constitution,OriginalIntent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 823,
829-32 (1986); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1218-24
(1967); Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositionson Private Property, Public Rights, and the
New Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 265, 267-70, 284-87 (1996); RoseAckerman & Rossi, supra note 152, at 1439-40, 1477-79; Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the
Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 61-67 (1964); Torres, supra note 4, at 16-17.
238. See, e.g., Milnot Co. v. Richardson, 350 F. Supp. 221, 224 (S.D. Ill. 1972)
(invalidating statutory ban on interstate shipment of Milnot, a filled milk product, because
the Filled Milk Act, which prohibited such interstate shipment, did not bar otherwise
identical products from moving freely in interstate commerce); Heimgaertner v. Benjamin
Elec. Mfg. Co., 128 N.E.2d 691, 695-97 (Ill. 1955) (striking down a state statute as
irrational under state constitution substantive due process review); Monrad G. Paulson,
The Persistence of Economic Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REv. 91, 94-117
(1950) (describing the survival of meaningful substantive due process review of economic
legislation in some state supreme courts); cf. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 463-70 (1957)
(invalidating on equal protection grounds, as irrational, a law that singled out American
Express for special positive treatment in sale of money orders); see also United States v.
Carolene Prods Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-54 (1938) (providing the rational basis test as the
proper standard for evaluating economic and social legislation that does not rely upon a
suspect classification or adversely affect a fundamental right); TRIBE, supra note 237, § 87, at 582-86 (describing the decline, but not abolition, of substantive due process review of
economic legislation in the federal courts).
239. See generally Jim Chen, Commentary, The Second Coming of Smith v. Ames, 77
TEx. L. REv. 1535, 1562-65 (1999) (providing cogent arguments for restricting the
Takings Clause to its textual and historical limits in the context of so-called "deregulatory
takings" and warning that if the federal courts fail to reject efforts to expand the Takings
Clause to reach deregulatory takings "[t]hese Takings Clause arguments will become ever
more aggressive, even downright outrageous").
240. See William L. Church, The Eastern Enterprises Case: New Vigor for Judicial
Review?, 2000 WIS. L. REv. 547,552-56.
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underpinnings of the Takings Clause, however, it becomes rather
difficult to ground an alternative theory of the Takings Clause other
than by ad hoc reference to one's personal attitude toward the
general wisdom and desirability of government regulation of private
property interests.2 41 Attention to history and tradition seems
preferable to an unfettered judicial mandate to strike down economic
4
and social legislation at will under the rubric of the Takings Clause
Reliance on a theory of expropriatory intent would, therefore,
rest upon a particularized understanding of government actions that
constitute "expropriation" rather than "regulation." As a matter of
economic fact, all government regulation expropriates, insofar as it
either prohibits economically desirable conduct or mandates
economically undesirable conduct. The federal courts should find
expropriatory intent only in the limited circumstances where
government regulation is but a step removed from the direct
uncompensated exercise of eminent domain powers.243 The Takings
Clause, properly understood, does not prohibit government
regulation, but rather government expropriation. 2 4 Only when the
facts demonstrate that government has for all intents and purposes
engaged in an eminent domain action should a takings claim lie. Of
course, this approach would not deny citizens the proper protection
241. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 229-30 (1990) ("My
difficulty is not that Epstein's Constitution would repeal much of the New Deal and the
modern regulatory-velfare state but rather that these conclusions are not plausibly related
to the original understanding of the Takings Clause."); Bork, supra note 237, at 829-32
(arguing that "only by limiting themselves to the historic intentions underlying each clause
of the Constitution can judges avoid becoming legislators" and noting specifically that
"[f]or the subject of economic rights, that means we must turn away from the glamor of
abstract philosophic discourse and back to the mundane and difficult task of discovering
what the Framers were trying to accomplish with the Contracts Clause and the Takings
Clause"); see also MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONsTrruTiON AWAY FROM THE
COURTS 157 (1999) ("The Framers simply did not think that there could be what we now
call a regulatory taking.").
242. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500-02 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in judgment) (finding a right to marital privacy implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty given a history/tradition of special recognition of the marital relationship
at common law and urging federal judges when interpreting vague constitutional language
to abjure reliance on clever tests in favor of "continual insistence upon respect for the ...
the teachings of history" and "solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our
society"); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,541-44 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
history and tradition provide the best and most reliable means of cabining the scope of
judicial discretion when interpreting otherwise vague constitutional text).
243. See supra text and accompanying notes 99-124.
244. See TUSHNET, supra note 241, at 157 (noting that for the Framers "takings were
physical invasions of property, and they happily imposed regulations that destroyed the
value of a piece of property without offering the owner any compensation").
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of the Takings Clause, but rather would require citizens aggrieved by
economic or social legislation to plead and prove their case under the
doctrine of substantive due process.245
A final, structural argument supports limiting the scope of the
Takings Clause to a particular subset of government actions that

adversely affect private property interests. Congress could exercise
virtually none of the powers set forth in Article I, Section 8 without

access to revenue or in the absence of an ability to compel
behavior.2 46 If the framers of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause
intended it to pro tanto repeal the enumerated powers of the federal
government, it does seem rather odd that the Supreme Court failed to
notice this fact until 1922.247

Ultimately, any theory of the Takings Clause will require its
proponents to draw and defend lines. Some expropriations constitute
takings, whereas other government actions that adversely affect
property interests do not constitute expropriations at all. Just as the
First Amendment does not privilege wire or mail fraud, even if one
engages in speech to accomplish the fraud, 48 not every government
action can give rise to an obligation to pay compensation if the
business of government is to continue. This Article proposes a line of
demarcation derived from the core concern of the Takings Clause:

uncompensated exercises of the power of eminent domain.

245. As Professor Mark Tunick has observed:
Restricting its interpretation of the Takings Clause by using the plain meaning of
'take' would not necessarily diminish property protections, because there are
other provisions in the Constitution providing protection to property owners. In
fact, the Due Process Clauses can be construed more naturally than can the
Takings Clause to restrict unjustified government limitations on use.
See Mark Tunick, ConstitutionalProtectionsof Private Property: Decoupling the Takings
and Due ProcessClauses, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 885, 898 (2001).
246. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to maintain a military, or build post roads,
or regulate commerce, without an ability to spend money and constrain behavior in ways
that adversely affect wealth maximization. Moreover, promoting the useful arts and
sciences through a system of copyrights and patents undoubtedly limits the ability of
entrepreneurs to trade in copyrighted or patented materials. All of these enumerated
federal powers would be rendered nugatory if the government's exercise of them triggered
an obligation to compensate citizens for any adverse effect on existing property interests.
247. See generallyPa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-16 (1922); see also United
States v. Sec. Indust. Bank, 459 U.S. 70,78 (1982) (citing and applying Pennsylvania Coal);
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979) (citing Pennsylvania Coal as the
source of the regulatory takings doctrine and applying the doctrine to a federal regulatory
scheme).
248. See S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy & Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Recalibratingthe
Cost of Harm Advocacy: Getting Beyond Brandenburg, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1159,
1160-68, 1171-73, 1180-85 (2000).
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One could, of course, propound and defend a different, perhaps
broader, vision of the Takings Clause. Doing so would require an
alternative understanding of the core purpose of the clause, and a
plausible limiting principle that cabins the scope of the clause so as to
permit government to continue its operations. To date, the Supreme
Court's regulatory takings cases do not reflect a consistent theme, or
an intelligible limiting principle. If a majority of the Justices elect to
reject expropriatory intent as a limiting principle for the Supreme
Court's regulatory takings doctrine, the Justices should at least take
the time and trouble to articulate an alternative theory that brings a
modicum of doctrinal clarity to this troubled field of constitutional
law.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's contemporary regulatory takings
jurisprudence consists of a series of discrete, unrelated tests and lacks
a single unifying theory. Adoption of an expropriatory intent
requirement as an essential element of a valid takings claim would
bring needed doctrinal clarity and focus to the Supreme Court's
regulatory takings jurisprudence. Moreover, as noted above, it would
not necessarily upset the results that the Justices have reached in the
recent regulatory takings cases (Lucas and Eastern Enterprises
excepted, of course).24 9

The Supreme Court's decisions involving direct regulations on
land use deploy constitutional tests and verbal formulas wholly
removed from those that it has invoked in cases involving conditional
approvals of zoning variances. Expropriatory intent would refocus
regulatory takings jurisprudence along the lines initially sketched by
Justice Holmes in Mahon: only when a regulatory action is
tantamount to a direct expropriation should a takings claim lie. The
Supreme Court could best incorporate this rule by requiring a
showing of expropriatory intent as a necessary element of a
regulatory takings claim.

249. See supra text and accompanying notes 153-208.

